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Abstract  
My primary areas of research interest are international economics, political economy of trade 
policy, and protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). I focus the first chapter of my PhD 
dissertation on cross-border IPR protection. I use a mixture of theory and empirical analysis to 
study the economic incentive that drives dual standards in IPR protections in a country's legal 
system. The second and the third chapters of my dissertation focus on trade policies of regional 
trade agreements (RTA), and particularly on identifying political and economic incentives for 
tariff cooperation between governments in free trade areas and its implications for the world 
trade system. 
In the first chapter, we address the following question - are judges concerned, in the same way 
as policy makers, with the effects of their decisions on national welfare? We analyze this 
question by examining the outcomes of intellectual property rights (IPR) litigations between 
domestic and foreign firms. We develop a simple model of oligopoly where foreign firms have 
access to more efficient production technology and show that discriminatory weak protection of 
foreign-owned IPR always increases national welfare. We also show that the positive welfare 
effect increases with the size of the foreign innovator, as well within the size of the domestic 
imitator. The predictions of the model are tested using the data on all Canadian IPR cases over 
a four-year period. We find that a domestic firm is substantially more likely, by 13 percentage 
points, to succeed in litigations with a foreign firm than with another Canadian firm. We also find 
evidence supporting the hypothesis of the home bias in the legal system. Specifically, we 
establish that courts' decisions are aligned with welfare maximization principles so that foreign 
firms are less likely to win in those cases when the implied welfare effects of not protecting 
foreign IPR are greater. 
In the second chapter, we show that the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) tariff 
preferences have triggered a decline in Canadian external tariffs, explaining a two percentage 
point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998. Next, we found that industries 
which generate the least export rent to the US firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in Canada; 
this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the US and Canada. 
Finally, we estimate the effect of the CUSFTA on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade 
policy in Canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying 
activity. 
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In the last chapter, we develop a model of endogenous trade policy formation to study the 
impact of preferential trade agreements (PTA) on members' external trade policies when 
members internalize the intra-bloc welfare effects. This model is empirically tested using global 
trade data covering 170 countries and 177 PTAs established between 1988 and 2011. This 
paper finds empirical evidence of tariff cooperation between members of FTAs. Using three 
different measures of political relations (the affinity scores from the UN General Assembly 
Voting Data, dyad alliances data, and bilateral events and interactions data), we show that 
members with good political relation cooperate more on external tariff policy after formation of 
FTAs. On average, an increase in market share of PTA partners' firms by one standard 
deviation is associated with about 3 percentage point increase in external tariff in industries that 
matter for intra-bloc members. 
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Chapter 1
Home Country Bias in the Legal System: Empirical Evidence
from the Intellectual Property Protection in Canada
1.1 Introduction
With the continuous rise in the number of intellectual property rights (IPR) suits and associated
damages awards worldwide, there is a pronounced trend for rms involved in cross-border
litigations to le complaints with, and often receive favor from, a home country jurisdiction.
In the recent intellectual property battles between the U.S.-based Apple Inc. (Apple) and
the South Korea-based Samsung Electronics Co. (Samsung), Apple sued Samsung for patent
infringements over the design and technology of its mobile devices in several countries, and
the outcomes vary substantially across di¤erent jurisdictions. The U.S. court ruled in favor
of the U.S. rm and on August 24, 2012 awarded Apple over a billion dollars in damages.1
However, when the same claim was led with the Seoul Central District Court in South Korea,
the decision was in largely favor of Samsung. Moreover, a counterclaim by the South Korean
rm that Apple had violated some of its own patents resulted in several of Apples devices being
banned from sale in Korea. Yet the same claim was denied by the U.S. jury. Another patent
infringement case between the Canadian Research in Motion (RIM) and the U.S. Visto share
many similarities. Visto brought RIM to the U.S. court, and although Vistos patents were
1The damage amount was later revised to half a billion dollars.
1
broadly considered invalid, the lawsuit was settled with RIM paying 267:5 million dollars to
Visto in 2009. In contrast, when RIM brought Visto to the Canadian Federal Court for patent
violation, the decision was in favor of RIM.
The above prominent cases suggest that the legal system may become a form of protection-
ism, whereby rms involved in cross-country IPR litigations may have a signicant advantage
over foreign rms in their home country jurisdiction. In this study, we set out to investigate
whether foreign rms are systematically disadvantaged in IPR litigations with domestic rms.
We test this hypothesis using novel data on all IPR litigation cases in Canada that took place
between 2007 and 2010. With 1079 litigation cases in our data, we identify the country of resi-
dence for 2502 rms involved in those cases, and relate it to the probability of winning the case
in Canadian courts. We nd that the nationality of a rm is a statistically and economically
signicant determinant of success rate in a courtroom. Foreign rms litigating in Canada have
a much smaller likelihood of winning a case: while a Canadian rm has a 50% probability of
winning in IPR litigation against another Canadian company, the probability of winning against
a foreign rm is 60%. This result is very persistent and is remarkably robust to the denition
of a foreign rm, to inclusion of a variety of case-related xed e¤ects, and to rm size controls.
We next attempt to identify whether foreign rmsdisadvantage in IPR disputes can be
driven by welfare-consideration concerns. A large body of literature analyzes welfare gains
from the discrimination of foreign IPR owners. The success of a foreign rm in IPR litigation
with a domestic rm implies a transfer of intellectual property along with its associated market
value to a foreign jurisdiction, which may have a negative impact on both domestic prots and
consumer surplus. Therefore, a welfare-maximizing policy maker may want to protect domestic
innovators more rigorously than foreign ones. However, the room for discrimination of foreign
IPR owners is substantially reduced by several international treaties on IPR protection. Most
importantly, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
to which all member countries of the World Trade Organization must adhere, determines the
minimum standards for IPR protection and empowers legal authorities to grant relief by way
of injunction or damages. Yet implementation of these agreements by the national legal system
may not be completely unbiased towards foreign IPR owners. In particular, being concerned
about the impact of their orders on national well-being, judges may factor welfare considerations
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into their decisions. If domestic rms are more likely to win in those IPR cases which result in
larger welfare gains, it would imply that, despite international treaties, countries can achieve
better social outcomes by violating national treatment in patent protection. Whether the
legal system fosters discrimination of foreign innovators or is independent of national welfare
considerations is an empirical question, which we try to answer in this study.
To test whether home bias is present in the legal system, we develop a simple partial
equilibrium model where domestic and foreign rms compete in an oligopolistic market with
a homogeneous good. A foreign rm is assumed to have access to a more e¢ cient production
technology, associated with lower production costs, that domestic rms may try to imitate.
Using this model, we identify several economic factors that increase welfare gains from weak
protection of foreign IPR. First, the model predicts that a social planner would choose not to
protect foreign IPR when the domestic imitator is larger, in which case imitation has a stronger
negative e¤ect on domestic prices and a positive e¤ect on consumer surplus. Second, the welfare
gains from not protecting foreign IPR are increasing with the size of the foreign rm due to a
stronger prot reallocation e¤ect from foreign to domestic rms. Therefore, the model predicts
that if welfare considerations lead to home country bias in the legal system, we should expect
the size of the rm to be positively (negatively) related to the likelihood of success in IPR
litigation for domestic (foreign) rms.
Testing these two predictions of the model empirically, we nd support for the home country
bias hypothesis in the data. The analysis reveals that the size of a rm, measured either by
revenue or employment, has a positive (negative) association with the probability of winning
a case for domestic (foreign) rms. This relationship is statistically signicant and economi-
cally sizable: a one standard deviation increase in log revenue is linked to a 13:3 percentage
point increase in success probability for domestic rms and a 16:1 percentage point decrease
for foreign rms. This result implies that courts decisions are aligned with welfare maxi-
mization principles. Although this result admits alternative explanations, we believe that the
provocative relationship between courtsdecisions and the implied welfare e¤ects will promote
the research agenda and stimulate more research on identication of the factors behind foreign
rmsdisadvantage in IPR litigations.
Yet our empirical methodology does allow us to rule out some alternative interpretations of
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the home bias hypothesis. First, this nding cannot be explained by di¤erent e¤ort levels and
resources that domestic and foreign rms put into litigation. For both types of rms, there is
a positive relationship between the rm size and the private gains from IPR protection; hence,
we would expect to see large foreign rms spending more resources on protecting their IPR.
Therefore, the negative relationship between foreign rms revenue and likelihood of success
in a courtroom, observed in the data, cannot be rationalized by di¤erent e¤orts of domestic
and foreign rms in IPR litigations. However, it is consistent with the home bias hypothesis
because private gains of foreign rms are not part of national welfare, and the welfare gains from
imitating the foreign rms technology are increasing in the size of the foreign rm. Second, we
nd that our results are not driven by di¤erences in familiarity with the Canadian legal system
between domestic and foreign rms. In one of the robustness tests, we control for rmsprior
litigation experience and nd that our main results remain qualitatively unchanged. Third, we
show that being registered in a country that has good political relations with Canada does not
reduce the bias against foreign rms, suggesting that political factors are unlikely to explain
our main nding. Finally, the results are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of xed e¤ects
such as industry, location and type of jurisdiction, subject of litigation, and time period.
Our study provides several contributions to the literature on IPR protection. While the
evidence of the presence of home bias in national policies abounds, whereby governments vary
the intensity of IPR protection in order to increase national welfare at the expense of foreign
agents, most of the previous literature assumes national treatment of foreign IPR owners. Our
study is the rst to show that discrimination against foreign rms can take place not only at
the policy level but also at the implementation level as foreign innovators may not be able
to protect their intellectual property as e¤ectively as domestic ones. It implies that stringent
IPR laws at the country level do not guarantee that the interests of foreign innovators is well
protected.
This paper is also the rst study that analyzes the role of the legal system in di¤erential
treatment of foreign and domestic IPR owners. We show that even if the policies conform to
the national treatment principle and do not discriminate against rms based on their country
of origin, the legal system can serve as a channel for violation of the national treatment if courts
implement policies di¤erently for domestic and foreign rms. Although courts are supposed to
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prevent any discrimination against foreign IPR holders, this may not be the case if judges take
into account the e¤ect of their decisions on national well-being. Given the evidence we nd in
the Canadian data, home bias in the judicial system can be a more serious issue in developing
countries where institutions are less e¢ cient and legal systems are not completely independent
from government inuences.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1:2 surveys the literature on discrimination against
foreign nationals in general and in IPR in particular. Section 1:3 presents the theoretical model
on the e¤ect of discrimination against foreign IPR owners on national welfare. Section 1:4
outlines the empirical strategy, which is followed by the data description in Section 1:5. The
baseline results are reported in Section 1:6. Section 1:7 presents several extensions, and Section
1:8 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
It is commonly agreed that government incentives to protect IPR vary across countries. In the
theoretical literature, a number of studies show that countries actively involved in innovation
activities are keener on protecting IPR than countries with low levels of innovation. Chin
and Grossman (1991) and Grossman and Lai (2004) show that the interests of developed and
developing countries conict in the matter of IPR protection due to opposite impacts of stricter
IPR enforcement on welfare in the two groups of countries. The innovative countries benet from
extension of stronger IPR rules to developing ones because stronger IPR protection increases
the rent transferred from the latter to the former and the ability to recoup investments in
R&D by innovating rms. In contrast, tightening of the IPR rules in the developing countries
increases the monopolistic power of foreign rms and restricts the opportunity of domestic rms
to produce inexpensive imitations using foreign technologies (also see Helpman, 1993; Diwan
and Rodrik, 1991; Hunt, 2006).2
Since policy-makers tend to support domestic rms in competition with foreign ones, they
2Deardor¤ (1992) adds to the above literature that the global welfare as a whole decreases if stricter IRP
rules extend globally because increased market power of rms in developed countries could eventually exhaust
the market share of resource-constrained rms from developing countries. Due to the downside of extensive IPR
protection, McCalman (2001) alert to the danger of the global spread of stronger IPR rules and advocate weaker
IPR rules for developing countries.
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are typically less interested in protecting IPR owned by foreign rms. It is thus not surprising
that incentives for adoption and enforcement of IPR protection rules vary between countries
depending on the relative innovation intensity of foreign and domestic rms.3 Prior to the
Uruguay Round of the WTO negotiations, the standards for IPR protection had varied a lot
across the WTO members and this variation was closely related to their level of economic
development. Developed countries were characterized by higher IPR standards designed to
stimulate local innovation. A vast majority of developing countries, on the other hand, had
weak IPR rules, with many of them lacking any adequate mechanisms for IPR protection.
Rising welfare costs to the countries where innovative rms reside, implied by globalization and
weak IPR rules in developing countries, led a group of developed countries to form a campaign
for a global standardization of IPR protection, which resulted in Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement.
The TRIPS agreement, which came into force in 1996, is a system of rules that governs
the practices of IPR protection among all WTO member countries. The TRIPS outlines the
minimum protection standards for the length and the width of each type of intellectual property
(e.g. trademarks, patent, industrial designs, and etc.) and details the enforcement procedures.
Each WTO member country is required to meet the minimum standards of the TRIPS within a
specied deadline, and most of the developing countries have undertaken substantial reforms to
their legal systems in order to meet these standards. In contrast, the majority of the developed
WTO member countries already had IPR protection laws that met or exceeded the TRIPS
standards before the agreement became e¤ective (Deere, 2008). Overall, the TRIPS has only
mitigated the variation in international IPR protection but hardly eliminated the incentives
of countries to deviate from the TRIPS standards. Large variation in TRIPS implementation
persisted even ten years after the TRIPS had been in force. For example, developing countries
often miss the deadline for domestic law reforms for TRIPS implementation or exploit the
TRIPS exibility which o¤ers some degree of freedom in adjusting their policies to domestic
needs (Maskus, 2000). Furthermore, developed and developing countries often interpret the
3Geng and Saggi (2013) point out that even countries at the same level of economic development may be
better o¤ from weaker global IRP protection in the presence of trade frictions. In this case domestic become
more important than foreign markets and rms gain more from discreminatory treatment of foreign rms at
home.
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TRIPS provisions di¤erently to their own advantage (Musungu and Oh, 2006).
The above studies highlight the incentives of policy-makers to adopt di¤erent levels of IPR
protection depending on the relative stock of domestic and foreign-owned intellectual property.
Developed countries stick to stricter IPR protection standards in order to prevent leakage of
productive knowledge to other countries, while developing countries tend to encourage domestic
rms to imitate foreign intellectual property by adopting weaker standards. Thus far, the
majority of empirical studies on IPR in international context have focused on this relationship
between the level of IPR protection standard and its associated impact on national welfare (e.g.,
Maskus, 1995; Yang & Kuo, 2008). However, as the TRIPS agreement has narrowed the room
for di¤erences in IPR protection standards across countries, policy-makers may have switched
to alternative means of favoring domestic rms in order to either increase the transfer of foreign
technologies or decrease the outow of technologies to other countries. For example, there can
be varying degrees of rigor with which policy-makers enforce IPR protection rules, depending
on the nationality of the IPR owner.
Discrimination against foreign rms in various aspects of government policies is well doc-
umented in the literature. McAfee and McMillan (1989) discuss how the 1933 Buy American
Act has impacted the international trade pattern in the US and increased national welfare by
favoring local businesses with government procurement contracts. Branco (1994) shows that
a governments home bias against foreign rms, whereby foreign rms are required to cut the
prices of domestic rms by a certain margin, is necessary in order to induce lower market price
and to boost consumer surplus.4 A number of papers demonstrate that trade policies and reg-
ulations are used to discriminate against foreign rms in order to shift consumersexpenditure
from foreign to domestic products (e.g., Maggi and Goldberg, 1999 ; Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay, 2000). The above studies illustrate how the bias against foreign rms can arise in various
policies set by welfare-maximizing policy-makers.
In the IPR context, a number of papers have demonstrated the presence of home bias.
For example, several studies have shown that commercial and civil laws in some countries are
4Countries such as the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have explicit laws that give domestic rms
price advantages in auctions for government procurement contracts. European and Japanese governments have
rather implicit rules and requirements that reduce the chance for foreign rms to win government procurement
contracts (McAfee and McMillan, 1988).
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designed to discriminate against foreign patentees in favor of domestic ones. Lerner (2002)
shows that in a large number of countries discrimination against foreign patentees takes the
form of higher registration costs, shorter duration periods, more limitations on extensions, and
premature patent expirations. Liegsalz and Wagner (2013) argue that discrimination against
foreign patentees can exist even after the implementation of the TRIPS by empirically showing
that the Chinese State Intellectual Property O¢ ce favors domestic patentees by granting patents
to foreign rms for a signicantly shorter period of time. Webster et al (2014) investigate patent
examination outcomes in European and Japanese patent o¢ ces and show that foreign inventors
are less likely to obtain a patent grant than domestic inventors, and that the bias is stronger
in areas of technological specialization of the domestic economy.
1.3 Theoretical analysis
In this section we develop a simple model to study the factors that determine the e¤ect of
foreign IPR protection on welfare. Predictions of this model will be used to test whether the
bias that foreign rms may face in court can be explained by national welfare maximization
concerns. Consider an oligopolistically competitive market with rms producing a homogeneous
good traded at price p. On the demand side, preferences of a representative consumer are
characterized by a quadratic utility function:
U = Q  
2
Q2; (1.1)
where Q =
P
i qi is the total consumption of the homogeneous good and qi is the quantity
purchased from rm i. Maximizing utility function subject to the standard budget constraint,
we obtain the inverse demand function
p =   Q: (1.2)
Suppose there are N + 2 rms in the market. Firm 1 (F1) is a home country rm which may
attempt to imitate the production technology of a foreign rm. Firm 2 (F2) is the foreign rm
exporting to the home country market and utilizing a potentially more advanced production
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technology. The remaining N rms are symmetric in terms of costs and represent the rest of
the industry. We assume they are all domestic rms. Denote a representative rm from the
rest of the industry by F3. We further assume that each rm i has a constant marginal costs
ci. Prot function of rm i is then given by
i = (p  ci)qi: (1.3)
Using rst-order conditions for prot maximization and the market demand function, we obtain
the industry total output, price, consumer surplus (CS), and welfare (W ):
Q =
(N + 2)  c1   c2  Nc3
(N + 3)
(1.4)
p =
+ c1 + c2 +Nc3
(N + 3)
CS =

2
Q2
W = CS + 1 +N3 (1.5)
Suppose a foreign rm possesses a more advanced production technology, which lowers
marginal costs by  > 0.5 Let W0 be the value of the welfare function when the domestic legal
system protects IPR of the foreign rm and does not allow F1 to imitate its technology. In
this case, the marginal costs of the three rms are (c1; c2   ; c3). Also, let W1 be the value
of the welfare function when the legal system favors a domestic rm and allows it to imitate
technology of F2, so that the marginal costs of the three rms become (c1   ; c2   ; c3). Then
W = (W1  W0) reects the welfare gain from not protecting the IPR of the foreign rm, and
in our model W is always positive. This result is very intuitive. Since 1 enters the national
welfare function and 2 does not, an increase in relative productivity of F1 raises its market
share at the expense of other rms, including F2, and decreases the market price, thus raising
both consumer surplus and aggregate prot of domestic producers. Therefore, in the partial
equilibrium framework, when the e¤ect of IPR protection on incentives to innovate is not taken
into account, allowing domestic rms to imitate advanced foreign technologies is always in a
5The case when a domestic rm possesses a superior technology and F2 tries to imitate it is symmetric and
all predictions of the model continue to hold.
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countrys best interest.
In what follows we perform some comparative-static exercises to derive the implications of
the relative size of domestic and foreign rms for the gain from not protecting foreign rms
IPR. Since a rms relative size is determined by relative marginal costs, we rst di¤erentiate
W with respect to c2:
@W
@c2
=   (2N + 3) 
 (N + 3)2
< 0: (1.6)
Equation (1.6) implies that for small c2 (when foreign rm is large and e¢ cient) allowing F1
to imitate technology of F2 will have a stronger positive impact on home country welfare. This
e¤ect stems from reallocation of market shares from foreign to domestic rm, which is increasing
in the size of the foreign rm. Similarly, the relationship between W and the size of F1 is
@W
@c1
=   2 (N + 2)
 (N + 3)
+
3
 (N + 3)2
 < 0: (1.7)
Therefore, when a domestic rm is originally larger and more e¢ cient (c1 is small), the positive
e¤ect of allowing it to imitate foreign technology on welfare is stronger. This result is driven
by reallocation of market shares from F2 to F1, which is increasing in relative productivity of
F1, and by the e¤ect on prices, which is stronger when the domestic imitator is larger.
The above results lead us to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If discrimination against foreign IPR owners by the judicial system is driven
by national welfare considerations, then in IPR litigations between foreign and domestic rms,
the following must hold:
(a) Domestic rms have higher likelihood of success
(b) The probability of winning against a domestic rm must decrease in the size of a foreign
rm
(c) The probability of winning against a foreign rm must increase in the size of a domestic
rm
Proposition 1 allows as to test the hypothesis that welfare considerations are present in the
legal system and can thus explain the bias against foreign IPR holders. Part (a) relates to
the fact that W is always positive; hence, a welfare-motivated judge would always tend to
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protect domestic IPR more stringently than foreign. Parts (b) and (c) relate to equations (1.6)
and (1.7), and state that the bias of a welfare-motivated court against foreign IPR owners is
increasing in the size of both domestic and foreign rms.
1.4 Econometric Specications
In this section we discuss the empirical strategy that we use to identify home bias in IPR
enforcement in a legal system. The simplest structure to study the relationship between the
country of origin of a rm and the likelihood of winning a court case is the following probit
model:
Pr(Yij = 1) = (1Natij) (1.8)
where Yij is an indicator variable for success in court, which is equal to one if rm j succeeded
in winning the case i, and Natij is an indicator variable that takes the value of one when rm
j involved in case i is foreign. The coe¢ cient 1 in equation (1.8) measures the relationship
between nationality and the likelihood of winning the case. If foreign and domestic rms are
treated on equal footing in Canadian courts, 1 would be statistically indistinguishable from
zero. Negative 1 would support the hypothesis, formulated in Proposition 1(a) that foreign
rms are in general more likely to lose in IPR litigations with domestic rms. Yet, 1 < 0
could also signal the presence of some other factors, not necessarily related to bias, which could
disadvantage foreign rms in litigation processes, such as information asymmetry.
In order to test parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 1, we include the size of domestic and
foreign rms in equation (1.8):
Pr(Yij = 1) = (1Natij + 2Rsij + 3Natij Rsij): (1.9)
where Rsij is the log of revenue of rm j. If Canadian courts are more likely to favor domestic
rms when the implied welfare gains are larger, as predicted by the model, we would expect
the likelihood of winning the case to increase in the revenue for domestic rms (2 > 0) and to
decrease in the revenue for foreign rms (3 < 0).
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Previous literature has demonstrated that the outcome of the courts hearing can be a¤ected
by the relative size of litigating rms for reasons unrelated to national welfare. Lanjouw and
Schankerman (2004) argue that legal costs imply a greater nancial burden for smaller rms
relative to larger ones, thus lowering the probability of a successful outcome. In addition,
larger rms can a¤ord lawyers with better legal expertise and experience, which may inuence
a courts decisions (Szmer et al., 2007; McGuire, 1995 and 1998; Haire et al., 1999). Therefore,
positive 2 estimate may reect both the bias in the legal system and the negative impact on
rms that lack nancial resources. However, these channels have an opposite e¤ect on 3 and
its estimate can thus be used to gauge the relative importance of these two factors.
To account for other factors that may a¤ect a courts decisions, we add a number of xed
e¤ects to equation (1.9). Specically, we include xed e¤ects for the type of the jurisdiction
interacted with location,6 the subject of litigation,7 and the 6-digit NAICS industry in which
rm j operates. The 2012 Patent Litigation Study by PricewaterhouseCoopers8 shows that the
success rates and the median damage awards varies widely by industry, courts location, and
the subject of litigation. For example, patent holders in medical devices and electronics have
the highest success rate, while those in service business have the lowest success rate in litigation
among industries. We also include year xed e¤ects to control for variation in IPR regulations
and a courts willingness to enforce IPR over time (North, 1990). This rich array of xed e¤ects
allows us to control for many unobservable and resolve omitted variable bias stemming from
any possible variation in courtsdecisions over jurisdictions, industries, and time.
Finally, we also include a plainti¤ indicator variable (Plaintiffij) as a control which is
equal to one if rm j involved in case i is a plainti¤ and zero if it is a defendant
Pr(Yij = 1) = (1Natij + 2Rsij + 3Natij Rsij + 4Plaintiffij (1.10)
+Jur + Subj + Indust+ Y ear):
6The types of the jurisdictions are municipal court, provincial court, federal court, court of appeal, supreme
court, superior court, Canadian International Trade Tribunal, Trade-marks Opposition Board. Provincial courts
and courts of appeal are interacted with provincial dummy variables. More than 80% of all cases come from
federal court and Trade-marks Opposition Board.
7This includes copyright infringement, intellectual propterty violation, patent application opposition, patent
infringement, trademark infringement, trademark opposition.
8This study is available on-line at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
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This control is important because of the selection e¤ect in litigation, arising from asymmetric
information between the parties. While a plainti¤ has a choice of whether to initiate a litigation
process or not, a defendant has no such choice. Since litigation is costly, plainti¤s will not le a
claim unless the expected success rate is high enough for positive economic return. Therefore,
plainti¤s may be better informed than defendants about the odds of winning the litigation
process and this information asymmetry may be correlated with the nationality of a rm.
1.5 Data
Estimation of equation (1.10) requires information on the outcomes of a large number of IPR
litigations and on the rms involved in those litigations. We construct a database of all IPR-
related cases which took place in Canada in four consecutive years between 2007 and 2010.
The data is retrieved from the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII), which records
all litigations across all Canadian jurisdictions.9 For this study we select only those cases
which relate to IPR and involve disputes over patents, copyrights, trade marks, and industrial
designs.10 The nal data include 2; 502 rms involved in 1; 079 cases, where each case may
comprise multiple claims. For every case and rm, we record information on the name of
the rm, jurisdiction and location of the court, and the litigation subject. We also record
information on the courts decision for every claim of a case and keep track of all cases in which
the Canadian government is involved.
The data on IPR cases is complemented with rm-level information using three di¤er-
ent sources: rmsannual reports, the Canadian Company Capabilities (CCC) database, and
Manta. The data for publicly traded companies come from their annual reports, and include
the rms country of ownership, annual revenue, number of employees, and industrial a¢ liation,
which we record using the 6-digit NAICS industry classication. For rms that are not publicly
traded, our primary source of information is the CCC database maintained by the Industry
Canada. It provides information on the same information as above, although the data on rev-
enue is not as detailed.11 Our secondary source of information for non-publicly traded rms is
9Appeals are recorded as di¤erent cases in the CanLII databases and we treated them accordingly.
10We exclude all cases which involve individuals.
11The CCC database records rmsrevenues in ten size brackets. When CCC information on rms revenue
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Manta, an on-line business service directory which collects data directly from the companies.
The objective of this on-line business listing service is to build a network of companies and
connect possible partners, vendors, and suppliers. Manta provides the same information as the
CCC database and covers a large number of smaller rms, which are often missing in the CCC
database.12 Using these three sources of information, we were able to obtain required data for
74% of rms in our sample.
To construct the nationality indicator variable, we employ two methods. Our rst measure,
Natij , is based on the CCCs classication of rms into domestic and foreign, which denes
nationality based on the location of a rm. Therefore, a subsidiary of a foreign rm located
in Canada is recorded as a Canadian company according to CCC. As the second measure,
Nat_HQij , we dene nationality of a rm based on the country of residence of its headquar-
ters, which information we obtained either from the rms annual report or from the companys
website.13 For example, AstraZeneca Canada Inc., a subsidiary entity of a multinational phar-
maceutical company AstraZeneca plc., is classied as a Canadian rm in the CCC database
because it has manufacturing facilities in Canada. However, it will be classied as a foreign
rm in the second measure because its global headquarters is located in the United Kingdom.
If the bias against foreign rms is present in the Canadian legal system, these two measures will
allow us to say whether it is driven by the foreign ownership or by the geographical location of
a rm. Figures 1:1 and 1:2 compare the kernel density for the log of employment and revenue
between domestic and foreign rms respectively based on Nat_HQ denition. The gures
show that foreign rms are considerably larger, employing four times more workers and earning
seven times more revenue than an average domestic rm.
Construction of the dependent variable, which is an indicator variable for success in a case,
is straightforward for cases which include a single claim. For multi-claim cases, which are
is used in our data, we take the average of the lower and upper value of the bracket. For example the revenue
of the National Forming Systems Inc. is reported in CCC as between $10 and $25 million", so we record 17.5
million for its annual revenue.
12The information provided by Manta is self-reported and is thus not as accurate as annual reports or Industry
Canadas administrative records. However, for rms which are present in both Manta and CCC we did not nd
considerable discrepancies in reported revenue or employment.
13 It should be noted that not in all cases it is possible to identify the presence of a headquarters abroad. Out
of 1,458 rms in our sample which are registered in Canada, we managed to identied 117 with a headquarters
in another country.
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relatively scarce in our data,14 the task is more challenging since only some of the claims may
be granted to a plainti¤. Ideally, for such cases we would like to have information on the
relative importance of di¤erent claims for the case, which would allow us to evaluate whether
the main objective of the claim was achieved by the plainti¤. Unfortunately, this information
is unavailable to us and we rely on several approaches to classify cases in order to make sure
that our results are not driven by the way the dependent variable is constructed. First, we
consider a plainti¤ rm to win and the defendant to lose the case if at least one of the claims
is successful. Second, a plainti¤ rm is considered to win and the defendant to lose the case if
at least half of the claims in a case are successful. The summary statistics for the two success
indicators, Y 1ij and Y
2
ij , are presented in Table 1:1. The two denitions produce very similar
measures of Yij with the means around 0:5 the correlation coe¢ cient of 0:99. This similarity
suggests that our results will not vary much with the denition of Yij . Yet we report estimation
results from using several alternative ways of constructing the dependent variable in Section
1:7 and demonstrate that our main ndings are not sensitive to the denition of success in a
case.
1.6 Baseline results
Table 1:2 reports the probit regression of the baseline econometric specications (1.8)-(1.10).
Columns (1)-(4) show regression results when the case is assumed to be successful for the plainti¤
if at least one claim is granted. The results for specication (1.8) show that 1 is negative and
statistically signicant. This result implies that foreign rms have a lower probability of winning
an IPR-related case in a Canadian court. Moreover, 1 estimate has similar magnitude for both
measures of nationality, Natij (column 1) and Nat_HQij (column 2), suggesting that having
production facilities in Canada does not eliminate the bias. The average foreign rm in our
sample is 12 percentage point less likely to succeed in IPR litigation in Canada relative to the
average Canadian rm (column 2). In other words, while two local rms have equal chance of
14We have 165 rms involved in multiple claims, of which 124 involved in 2 cliams, 36 involves in 3 claims,
only 5 involved more than 3 claims. Most of these multi-claim cases are multiple IPR violations, or one violation
with improper use in multiple areas.
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success in litigation with each other, in cases involving domestic and foreign rms, the odds are
0:56 and 0:44 in favor of the domestic rm.
The nding that foreign rms are less likely to successfully protect their IPR in Canada than
local rms provides rst support for the hypothesis of the legal systems bias against foreign
rms. While this result may have other interpretations, columns (3) and (4) provide further
evidence for the bias hypothesis. Regression results reveal a signicant and positive link between
revenue of domestic rms and their likelihood of winning against foreign IPR owners. This is
consistent with the prediction of our theoretical model, summarized in Proposition 1(b), that
welfare gains from imitating foreign IPR are greater when the domestic imitator is larger. Yet
this result can also be explained by correlation between a rms revenue and some unobserved
rm-level characteristics. Most importantly, larger rms may have more to gain from a case
and thus be more inclined to put more e¤ort and resources into litigation.15 However, the
negative and signicant coe¢ cient on foreign rmsrevenue is at odds with this explanation.
Indeed, if the positive coe¢ cient on domestic revenue were due to the stronger e¤ort by larger
rms, driven by positive correlation between size and private gains from IPR protection, then
the coe¢ cient on foreign rmsrevenue would also be positive because larger foreign rms are
losing more from imitation of their technologies. At the same time, 3 < 0 is consistent with
the bias hypothesis because private gains of foreign rms is not part of national welfare, while
the negative e¤ect of imitation of foreign IPS by domestic rms on prices is increasing with size
of foreign rms.16
Turning to the quantitative assessment of the e¤ect of revenue on courtsoutcomes, eval-
uated at sample means, the coe¢ cients 2 = 0:035 and 3 =  0:025 in column (4) suggest
that a 10 percent increase in revenue is associated with a 0:14 percentage point increase in the
probability of success in litigation for domestic rms but only with a 0:04 percentage point
increase for foreign rms.17 It is important to note that foreign rmsdisadvantage in Cana-
15For example, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) and Szmer et al. (2007) show that larger rms have more
advantages than smaller rms in litigation.
16By the same argument, we can rule out the possible correlation between revenue and the amount of available
resources as the alternative interpretation for 2 > 0 because the e¤ect of resources on the likelihood of winning
should be the same for domestic and foreign rms.
17One standard deviation increase in log revenue is linked to a 13.3 percentage point increase in success prob-
ability for domestic rms and a 16.1 percentage point decrease for foreign rms. Marginal e¤ects of interaction
terms are calculated by the procedures outlined in Ai, Chunrong, and Norton (2003).
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dian courts operates entirely through the revenue term as the coe¢ cient on the foreign status
dummy variable becomes insignicant in column (4). Nevertheless, the estimates in column
(4) imply that a foreign rm with average revenue is 9:18 percentage point less likely to win
against a domestic rm, which is comparable to a 13:2 percentage point disadvantage identied
in column (2).
In columns (5)-(8) of Table 1:2 we report estimates of specication with Y 2ij as the dependent
variable. The results are very similar to those in columns (1)-(4), indicating that classication
of multi-claim cases into successful or not does not play a major role in our analysis. Because of
the high degree of similarity, in the analysis that follows we only report the results with Y 2ij as
the dependent variable. Columns (9)-(11) present results for the benchmark specication with
a full set of year, location of jurisdiction, industry, and subject of litigation xed e¤ects. The
results do not suggest that industrial a¢ liation, jurisdiction and location of a court, or subject
of litigation a¤ect foreign rmsdisadvantage in Canadian courts. That said, these additional
xed e¤ects do help explain the variation in success rates among rms, since many of the binary
variables are statistically signicant and including them in the model increases pseudo R-sqared
from 0:017 to 0:03. Adding a plainti¤ indicator variable in column (11) reveals that plainti¤s
are less likely to succeed, with the average success rate being 6:3 percentage points below of
that for defendants. At the same time, the main coe¢ cients of our interest are una¤ected by
inclusion of this variable in the regression.
1.7 Extensions
1.7.1 Prior litigation experience
Previous studies argue that process expertise, which is accumulated through past litigation
experience, could play an important role in courtsoutcomes because knowledge of institutional
rules and practices may place a litigant in a better position (McGuire, 1995 and 1998; France,
1998; Szmer et al., 2007). If domestic rms, being more exposed to the local judicial system,
have on average more experience with the Canadian courts than foreign rms, di¤erence in
experience levels could explain our previous results that foreign rms have a lower likelihood of
success in litigations. Indeed, in our data, over 60% of the foreign rms have no prior litigation
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experience in Canada compared to only 45% for the domestic rms. To control for rmsprior
litigation experience, we expand equation (1.10):
Pr(Yij = 1) = (1Natij + 2Rsij + 3Natij Rsij + 4Plaintiffij (1.11)
5Expij + Jur + Subj + Indust+ Y ear):
where Expij is a legal experience indicator for rm j. To construct this indicator, we searched
the CanLII database for the number of cases in which rm j had been involved in ten years
prior to case i. Summary statistics for prior litigation experience are provided in Table 1:1.
Figure 1:3 illustrates the di¤erence in prior litigation experience between domestic and foreign
rms. An average rm in our sample had been involved in 24 cases with the median being equal
to one. We classify rms into experienced and not experienced using di¤erent thresholds on the
number of prior cases in order to investigate the robustness of our results to the denition of
Expij . In columns (1)-(5) of Table 1:3 we use the thresholds of 1, 5, 10, and 30 on the number
of previous cases, and for each denition we report the number of rms classied as experienced
at the bottom of the table.
The results show that when rmsprior experience is controlled for, the coe¢ cients on the
key variables, such as domestic and foreign revenue, remain close to the benchmark values.18
The coe¢ cients on prior experience variables are statistically insignicant for all denitions of
Expij , although they are always positive. Contrary to previous studies, we failed to nd a
specication where the previous court experience would have a statistically signicant e¤ect
on the dependent variable. In column (6) we di¤erentiate rms in terms of the intensity of
prior legal experience. In particular, we use four quartiles of the prior experience distribution
to categorize all rms into four groups, using the rms without prior experience as a control
group. More experienced rms are found to have a higher likelihood of success in a court but
this pattern is also not statistically signicant.
In columns (3)-(6) we use the log of a rms age as a proxy for its outside-of-court experience.
18Note that after taking into account the size of both domestic and foreign rms in the estimation, the coe¢ cient
1 for Natij becomes statistically insignicant, which means that there is no obvious evidence showing smaller
size foreign rms are being disadvantaged against smaller size domestic rms.
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The intuition for using this variable is that it captures the e¤ect of a rms relative experience in
business operation and knowledge in the industry. Again, this measure of experience is positive
but not statistically signicant, and adding it to the benchmark specication does not a¤ect
our main results. Overall, we failed to nd any evidence for the hypothesis that prior legal
experience has a positive impact on success in a courtroom and that the di¤erence in success
rates between domestic and foreign rms is driven by di¤erence in legal experience.
1.7.2 The role of political connections
In Section 1.3 we hypothesized that the legal system may factor in welfare considerations, as
a government would do, in IPR disputes between domestic and foreign rms. The objective of
this section is to test whether the government plays any role in the mechanism that leads to
the disadvantage of foreign rms in Canadian courts. If both the courts and the government
share welfare-maximization concerns, can rms rely on the latter to increase their chances in a
courtroom? If they can, then we would expect politically connected rms to be more likely to
succeed in litigations, and since domestic rms have stronger ties to the government, it could
explain the ndings of the previous section.19
To construct a measure of a rms political inuence, we use information on lobbying activ-
ity obtained from the O¢ ce of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada. Lobbying expenditure
has long been used in the political economy literature to assess the degree of industrial political
activity. However, since the data on lobbying expenditure by rms are unavailable in Canada,
we approximate it by the number of o¢ cially registered lobbyists representing each rm. In
Canada, every person seeking a conversation with a public o¢ ce holder regarding any modi-
cations to current legislation or policies is required to register with the Lobbyist Registrar and
ll out a registration form. The form includes information on the beneciaries of the lobbying
activity (rms) and on the subjects of communication with the o¢ ce holders, selected from
a list of 46 descriptors. We use the subject of communication to categorize all lobbyists into
three groups according to their relevance to IPR. We dene a lobbyist as highly relevant
19While we do not expect politicians in Canada to be able to put direct pressure on the judiciary, indirect
inuence may be possible. For example, judges can be responsive to the medias reporting of legal proceedings,
which may also represent the governments political agenda. Alternatively, if politically connected rms are also
more likely to win in a court, it may simply reect similarity in values of political and judicial powers rather
than a formal relationship between the two.
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for IPR when the subject of communication is related to intellectual property, law and
justice enforcement, or research and development; lobbyists with subjects related to in-
dustry, international relations, and science and technology, are classied as relevant;
the remaining lobbyists are treated as irrelevant. If political connections matter for IPR lit-
igations, we would expect lobbyists proposing changes to the existing IPR regulations to have
stronger impact on the outcomes of litigations.
We measure the degree of political connectivity with a binary variable which takes the value
of one if a rm is connected and zero otherwise. Since rms di¤er in the number and the degree
of relevance of lobbyists who represent them, we classify a rm as connected using di¤erent
thresholds on the number of lobbyists. In column (1) of Table 1:4 a rm is considered to be
politically connected if it is represented by at least one lobbyist of any relevance. With this
denition, 15% of all rms are classied as connected; however, the coe¢ cient on the indicator
variable is negative and insignicant. This result is preserved for alternative denitions of
political connectivity in columns (2)-(5). Only when rms with at least ten highly relevant
lobbyists are classied as connected in column (6) does the coe¢ cient on political connectivity
variable become positive and signicant. However, with this denition only 11 rms are dened
as connected, and the coe¢ cient of interest may not be well identied. In column (7), we include
the interaction terms of foreign indicator with court experience and high relevant lobbying in
the estimation, and nd that the coe¢ cients for these interaction terms are not statistically
signicant.
Results in Table 1:4 provide no evidence that the intensity of communications between
litigating rms and policy-makers is associated with a higher likelihood of winning a case.
Therefore, we nd no support for the hypothesis that rms can use the legislative branch to
inuence a decision in a courtroom. To test whether the results are robust to di¤erent ways
of constructing the success indicator, we provide the estimation results of the key independent
variables in this study against the success indicator dened at di¤erent thresholds, and report
in Table 1:5. We nd that our main ndings are consistent with various denitions of success
in a case.
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1.8 Conclusions
The objective of this study is to investigate whether or not foreign rms are disadvantaged by the
Canadian legal system in IPR disputes with domestic rms, and whether economic incentives
play any role in discrimination against foreign IPR owners. Using the Canadian litigation data
on IPR disputes, we nd several notable results. First, domestic rms are more likely to win
in IPR litigations with foreign rms. The di¤erence in litigation success rate between domestic
and foreign rms is both economically and statistically signicant: foreign rms have about a
15 percentage point lower probability of winning against domestic rms. Second, using a simple
model, we show that discrimination against foreign IPR owners bring larger welfare gains when
either the foreign innovator or domestic imitator is large. Our empirical results reveal that
courts decisions are aligned with welfare maximization principles: a 10 percent increase in
the size of a domestic rm increases the litigation success rate by 2 percentage points, while
a similar increase in size of a foreign rm decreases its success rate by 2:5 percentage points.
In our empirical analysis we rule out some of the interpretations of the home bias result which
are alternative to welfare-maximization behavior of Canadian judges. In particular, we show
that discrimination against foreign rms cannot be explained by better familiarity of domestic
rms with the local legal system, by stronger political connections of domestic rms, or by
nationalism of Canadian judges.
The ndings of this study are important because they open a new window to an alternative
way to look for potential aws in the IPR protection, which so far has been largely overlooked.
The earlier theoretical and empirical literature on IPR protection under the North-South trade
framework has mostly focused on IPR protection policy. It has been conrmed that developing
countries tend to discriminate against foreign rms by adopting weaker IPR standards, because
intellectual property is mostly generated overseas and protecting it would only increase the
rent transferred to the North. With the proliferation of TRIPS, the scope for discrimination
of foreign IPR owners has decreased substantially. Our study demonstrates that countries can
violate national treatment in IPR protection since courts implement policies di¤erently to do-
mestic and foreign rms. As a result, even countries which adhere to TRIPS policies on IPR
protection can still discriminate against foreign IPR owners by applying those rules discre-
tionarily to domestic and foreign rms. Therefore, this study shows that raising international
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standards of IPR protection does not guarantee complete elimination of the home bias, and
the proper analysis of international IPR protection should look not only at the IPR protection
policies but also at the implementation of those policies by the legal system.
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1.9 Tables and figures 
 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max Observations
Decision (Y) 0.508 0.5 0 1 2502
Decision (Y*) 0.524 0.5 0 1 2502
Foreign indicator 0.361 0.48 0 1 2340
Foreign indicator (HQ) 0.411 0.492 0 1 2335
Log employees 5.053 3.1 0 13.21 1985
Log revenues 17.881 4.016 9.99 26.637 1856
Plaintiff indicator 0.482 0.5 0 1 2502
Gov. with domestic Firms 0.031 0.173 0 1 2335
Gov. with foreign Firms 0.039 0.194 0 1 2335
Experience 24.19 87.906 0 705 2337
Lobbying 0.452 1.882 0 40 2502
Source: CanLII, Industry Canada, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, Manta, and firms' annual reports. Decision(Y) is the court decision
which equals 1 if any of claim succeed. Decision(Y*) equals 1 if at least half of the claims succeed. Nat is a foreign indicator if no research or manufacturing
facilities, and subsidiary entities present in Canada. Nat_HQ is a foreign indicator if headquarter is outside of Canada. Plaintif equals 1 indicating for firms
being as plaintif in litigation. Dom_gov indicates for cases that government is on the side of domestic firms while foreign_gov indicates for government on
the side of foreign firms in the litigation. High_lobb, Low_lobb, and Irre_lobb indicate the number of lobbyists hired for high relevent, low relevent, and
irrelevent lobbying activities respectively. Lob_H equals 1 if at least 1 high relevent lobbyists hired. 
Table 1. Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)Foreign	indicator -0.304*** -0.285***(0.05) (0.05)[-0.121] [-0.114]Foreign	indicator	(HQ) -0.335*** -0.480*** -0.030 -0.321*** -0.476*** 0.004 -0.505*** 0.105 0.107(0.05) (0.07) (0.30) (0.05) (0.07) (0.30) (0.07) (0.32) (0.32)[-0.132] [-0.191] [-0.012] [-0.128] [-0.190] [0.002] [-0.201] [0.042] [0.043]Log	revenue 0.022*** 0.035*** 0.023*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.047*** 0.049***(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)[0.009] [0.014] [0.009] [0.015] [0.012] [0.019] [0	.020]Foreign	(HQ)	x	log	revenue -0.025 -0.026 -0.033** -0.033*(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)[-0.010] [-0.010] [-0.012] [-0.012]Plaintiff	indicator -0.158**(0.06)[-0.063]Jurisdiction	FE No No No No No No No No Yes Yes YesSubject	FE No No No No No No No No Yes Yes YesIndustry	FE No No No No No No No No Yes Yes YesYear	FE No No No No No No No No Yes Yes YesWald	chi2 30.233 35.540 43.092 46.645 25.462 31.366 40.563 44.281 73.128 78.735 85.250Log	likelihood -1607 -1600 -1264 -1262 -1609 -1602 -1265 -1263 -1229 -1227 -1224No.	of	observation 2340 2335 1855 1855 2340 2335 1855 1855 1829 1829 1829
Y
Notes: Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the variables. The marginal effect of the interaction terms are calculated by following the procedures in Ai, Chunrong, andEdward C. Norton (2003). Partial effect of the dummy variables is calculated as the increase in the probability of litigation success rate with a change in the dummy variable from zero toone. Standard errors and marginal effects are reported in round brackets and square brackets respectively. Y is the court decision which equals 1 if any of the claims succeeds. Y* equals 1if at least half of the claims succeed. Foreign indicator=1 if no research or manufacturing facilities, and subsidiary entities present in Canada. Foreign indicator (HQ)=1 if headquarter isoutside	of	Canada.	Plaintif	idicator=1	for	firms	being	as	plaintiff	in	litigation.	***,	**,	and	*	indicate	p<0.01,	p<0.05,	and	p<0.1	respectively.
Table	1.2	Probit	regression	estimation	of	court	outcomes	on	firms'	country	of	origin Y*
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)1X 5X 5X 10x 30xForeign	indicator	(HQ) 0.106 0.096 	0.322 0.305 	0.339 0.313(0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35)[0.042] [0.038] [0.081] [0.075] [0.089] [0.080]Log	revenue 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.045***(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)[0.020] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.021] [0.019]Foreign	(HQ)	x	log	revenue -0.033* -0.031* 	-0.039**	 	-0.038** -0.041** -0.039**(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)[-0.012] [-0.012] [-0.013] [-0.013] [-0.014] [-0.013]Plaintiff	indicator -0.159** -0.164*** -0.161** 	-0.160** 	-0.155** -0.160**(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)[-0.063] [-0.065] [-0.062] [-0.062] [-0.060] [-0.061]Log	firm	age 0.011 	0.011 	0.014 0.011(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]Court	experience 0.007 0.079 	0.086 0.099 0.001(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12)[0.003] [0.031] [0.029] [0.035] [0.006]Exper.(1st	-	25th	per) -0.025(0.10)[-0.010]Exper.	(26th	-	50th	per) 0.027(0.11)[0.005]Exper.	(51th	-	75th	per) 0.054(0.11)[0.017]Exper.	(76th	-	up) 0.074(0.12)[0.021]Number	of	firms	(a) 1354 828 828 646 410 [373,241,282,458]Wald	chi2 94.675 94.927 85.196 85.440 85.163 85.071Log	likelihood -1219 -1219 -1101 -1101 -1101 -1101No.	of	observation 1830 1830 1655 1655 1655 1655
Table 1.3 Probit regression estimation of court outcome on firms' nationalities takeninto account effects from priorexperience.
Notes: Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the variables. The marginal effect of the interaction terms are calculated byfollowing the procedures in Ai, Chunrong, and Edward C. Norton (2003). Partial effect of the dummy variables is calculated as the increase inthe probability of litigation success rate with a change in the dummy variable from zero to one. Standard errors and marginal effects arereported in round brackets and square brackets respectively. Court experience indicates for firms that have at least the number of litigationinvolvements specified by each column head in the last 10 year prior to litigation. The number of firms satisfying the specification issummarized in "Number of fims". All regressions are controlled for subject, jurisdiction location, industry, and time trend fixed effects. ***, **,and * indicate p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. (a) This value indicates the number of firms in the sample that satisfy the criteria to beexperienced firms in litigation in Canada. In column (6), 373, 241, 282, 458 indicate the number of firms in the first, second, third and fourthlitigation	experience	quartile	respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Any High_Low High High	X	2 High	X	5 High	X	10 HighForeign	indicator	(HQ) 0.103 0.098 0.100 0.095 0.146 0.136 0.178(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.35)[0.041] [0.039] [0.040] [0.038] [0.058] [0.054] [0.071]Log	revenue 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.047***(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019]Foreign	(HQ)	x	log	revenue -0.032* -0.031* -0.032* -0.031* -0.035** -0.034** -0.037*(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)[-0.012] [-0.012] [-0.012] [-0.012] [-0.013] [-0.013] [-0.014]Plaintiff	indicator -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.163*** -0.166*** -0.169*** -0.167***(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)[-0.065] [-0.065] [-0.065] [0.065] [-0.066] [-0.068] [-0.067]Court	experience	(5x) 0.101 0.096 0.091 0.090 0.065 0.067 0.074(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.080) (0.10)[0.040] [0.038] [0.036] [0.036] [0.026] [0.027] [0.030]Lobbying -0.094 -0.081 -0.071 -0.067 0.210 0.805* -0.115(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.18) (0.44) (0.16)[-0.038] [-0.032] [-0.028] [-0.027] [0.084] [0.321] [-0.046]Foreign	(HQ)	x	Court	experience	(5x) 0.045
(0.17)
[0.018]Foreign	(HQ)	x	Lobbying 0.087
(0.22)
[0.035]Number	of	firms	(a) 278 261 217 188 60 11 217Wald	chi2 95.535 95.221 95.032 94.970 96.541 97.989 95.294Log	likelihood -1218 -1218 -1219 -1219 -1218 -1217 -1218No.	of	observation 1830 1830 1830 1830 1830 1830 1830
Table	1.4	Robustness	checks	for	probit	regression	estimation	of	court	outcome	on	firms'	nationalities	taken	into	account	effects	from	prior	experience	and	lobbying.
Notes: Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the variables. The marginal effect of the interaction terms are calculated by following theprocedures in Ai, Chunrong, and Edward C. Norton (2003). Partial effect of the dummy variables is calculated as the increase in the probability of litigationsuccess rate with a change in the dummy variable from zero to one. Standard errors and marginal effects are reported in round brackets and squarebrackets respectively. Court experience (5x) indicates at least 5 times litigation involvements for the firm in the past prior to litigation. Lobbing=1 if the firmhires the type and the number of the regarding lobbyist specified by each column head. For example, in column (1) `Any' indicates the firm has hired anylobbyist; in column (4) `High X 2' indicates the firm has hired at least 2 lobbyists communiting high relevant subjects on behalf of the firm. All regressionsare controlled for subject, jurisdiction location, industry, and time trend fixed effects. The specification of the lobbyist indicator is defined by each columnand the number of firms satisfying the specification is summarized in "Number of fims". ***, **, and * indicate p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. (a)This	value	indicates	the	number	of	firms	in	the	sample	that	satisfy	the	criteria	to	be	political	connected	firms.	
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Y_01 Y_25 Y_50 Y_75 Y_90(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Foreign	indicator	(HQ) -0.004 0.002 0.100 0.414 0.350(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)Log	revenue 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.049***(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)Foreign	(HQ)	x	log	revenue -0.026 -0.026 -0.032* -0.047*** -0.045***(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)Plaintiff	indicator -0.162*** -0.172*** -0.164*** -0.162*** -0.175***(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)Court	experience	(5x) 0.099 0.094 0.091 0.126 0.123(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)Lobbying	(high	relevent) -0.097 -0.095 -0.071 -0.005 -0.004(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)No.	of	observation 1835 1835 1830 1830 1830Log	likelihood -1219 -1221 -1219 -1211 -1209Wald	chi2 97.906 96.035 95.032 103.221 107.012Notes: Standard errors are reported in round brackets. Y_01, Y_25, Y_50, Y_75 and Y_90 are success indicatorswhich equal 1 if win ratios are at least 0.01, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90 respectively. All regressions are controlled forsubject, jurisdiction location, industry, and time trend fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1respectively.
Table	1.5	Robustness	checks	for	different	thresholds	of	win-ratio	for	probit	estimation	of	court	outcome	on	nationality.
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Figure 1.1
Comparison of log employment between domestic and foreign firms
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Figure 1.2
Comparison of log revenue between domestic and foreign firms.
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Figure 1.3
Comparison of prior litigation court experience between domestic and foreign firms.
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Chapter 2
The E¤ect of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement on
Canadian Multilateral Trade Liberalization
2.1 Introduction
Do members in Free Trade Area (FTA) cooperate on their external tari¤ policy? This is an
important question to policy makers because it carries the centric information on the welfare
consequencies of FTA. Preferential trade agreements (PTA) have ourished around the world
ever since the rst one was established in 1958. Extensive research has been done concerning
the implications of PTAs on multilateral trade liberalization and the welfare of member coun-
tries. However, neither theoretical nor empirical analysis has reached a consensus on whether
or not joining a PTA would make a country more or less open to trade with non-members. The
theoretical literature proposed several channels for the e¤ect of a PTA on external tari¤s, and
while some of them lead to acceleration in trade liberalization towards non-member countries
(Bagwell and Staiger, 1997b; Freund, 2000; Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos, 2004; Ornelas,
2005a), others have the opposite e¤ect (Panagariya and Findlay, 1994; Grossman and Help-
man, 1995; Krishna, 1998; Limao, 2007). As the impact of a PTA on trade policy may vary
across agreements, it has become necessary to provide more country-specic analysis in order
to understand the welfare implication of a PTA for specic nations.
In this paper, we study the e¤ect of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) on
Canadas multilateral trade liberalization (MTL). We develop a simple theoretical model with
endogenous trade policy formation. This model incorporates the main channels, identied in
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previous literature, through which a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) can a¤ect the MTL of its
member countries. Using Canadian trade data to test predictions of this model, we demonstrate
that the CUSFTA tari¤ preferences have resulted in considerable reduction in Canadian tari¤s,
explaining a 2:21 out of 4:02 percentage point decline in the average most favoured nation
(MFN) tari¤ rate between 1989 and 1998. We also show that the MFN tari¤ reductions were
deeper in industries that generated the least export revenue for US exporters. This nding
suggests that the Canadian government may be more inclined to reduce preference margins for
products which have smaller potential to generate rent to the partner country.
To outline our theoretical model, we consider the economy of three large countries and
monopolistically competitive markets. We start by deriving the e¤ect of an FTA on external
tari¤s if they were set non-cooperatively by welfare-maximizing governments. In this framework
there are two sources of complementarity between external and preferential tari¤s. First, there
are the terms-of-trade and tari¤ revenue e¤ects, similar to the ones obtained by Richardson
(1993) and Bagwell and Staiger (1997b), which lead to a decline in MFN tari¤s. A reduction
in the MFN tari¤s following the CUSFTA can moderate some e¢ ciency loss caused by the
distortionary e¤ect of preferential market access on the relative price of imports (Bagwell and
Staiger, 1997b; Freund, 2000; Ornelas, 2005b) and restore part of tari¤ revenue loss caused by
the shift in import demand towards the US-produced goods (Richardson, 1993). Second, there
is a market structure e¤ect which stimulates policy-makers to raise protection in industries with
a large domestic presence and a low degree of product di¤erentiation in order to redistribute
consumer expenditure from foreign to domestic varieties. Since in the presence of an FTA the
MFN tari¤ targets only the rest of the world (ROW) rms and part of the protection benets
ow to the partner country rms, the FTA will thus reduce the redistributive power of the
MFN tari¤ and contribute to deeper MTL.
Next, we extend the model by introducing cooperative motives in trade policy formation
by assuming that when the government of one country sets trade policy, it takes into account
the e¤ect on welfare of the partner country. When FTA member countries mutually internalize
the e¤ect of their policies, they keep external tari¤s high in order to generate more export rent
to their FTA partners. In a similar vein, Lim (2006) demonstrated that trade agreements with
cooperative trade policies tend to become more protectionist in the context of multilateral trade
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negotiations. This stumbling blocke¤ect of an FTA enters the expression for the equilibrium
tari¤ rate in additively separable way, which allows us to empirically identify its e¤ect on the
external tari¤s independently from other inuences.
As a last extension of our model, we incorporate political economy factors in policy-makers
preferences using the protection-for-sale framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). The
theory predicts that the strength of domestic lobbying for protection is inversely related to
the measure of import penetration. Hence, increased imports from a partner country following
formation of an FTA would weaken the lobbying power of domestic special interest groups
and reduce the level of protectionism. This e¤ect is identied by Ornelas (2005b) as rent
destruction since in the presence of an FTA a part of the rent from protection will ow to
the partner country rms, making lobbying less attractive and weakening political economy
distortions.
Our model identies and generates testable predictions for three factors that lead to com-
plementarity between multilateral and preferential tari¤s, and one factor contributing to sub-
stitutability. Estimating the model with Canadian tari¤ data during the time period of the
CUSFTA implementation, the main ndings of this study are as follows. First, the study
reveals a strong tari¤ complementarity between Canadian preferential and MFN tari¤s which
propagates through terms-of-trade and tari¤ revenue e¤ects. This positive relationship between
external and internal tari¤s is robust across all of our specications. Our results indicate that a
one percentage point reduction in preferential tari¤s was accompanied by 0:05 percentage points
reduction in MFN tari¤s in the short run and 0:3 0:35 percentage points reduction in the long
run. These estimates imply that the CUSFTA tari¤ preferences generated a decrease in the
MFN tari¤ rate of 2:1% for the average Canadian industry between 1989 and 1998, accounting
for 55% of observed external tari¤ cuts during that period. This result suggests that the size of
the partner country may play an important role for the e¤ect of an FTA on MTL because an
FTA will have small e¤ect on the terms-of-trade and tari¤ revenue when the partner country
is small.
The results on the e¤ect of the CUSFTA on lobbying activity, however, is inconclusive. Using
various measures of industrial lobbying activity we failed to nd any relationship between pref-
erential tari¤ liberalization and MFN tari¤ changes in politically organized industries. These
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results echo Ketterer, Bernhofen, and Milner (2014) who found no e¤ect of political economy
factors on the Canadian MFN tari¤ reductions in 1990s.1 Unlike most of the previous studies
that estimate the e¤ect of FTAs on the political economy of trade policy, we move away from
the assumption that all industries are equally involved in lobbying. We di¤erentiate industries
by lobbying intensity using the data from the Canadian Lobbyists Registry in order to identify
the number of lobbyists representing each industry. Through the use of these data, we construct
several alternative measures of industrial lobbying activity and use the modied protection for
sale model to structurally estimate the e¤ect of the CUSFTA on lobbying for MFN tari¤s. In
most specications we unable to nd any evidence of deeper tari¤ reductions in politically active
industries. While this result may imply that the rent destructione¤ect was not among the
main factors of the Canadian trade policy, it may as well be driven by lack of reliable measures
of sectorial lobbying intensity.
The evidence on the presence of trade policy cooperation in the CUSFTA is mixed. On
one hand, we show that the Canadian MFN tari¤s declined deeper in 20% of the industries
comprising the smallest US exports to Canada. The result that the Canadian government is
more open to trade liberalization in industries where it does not erode exports rent of the US
exporters is consistent with the hypothesis of trade policy cooperation. On the other hand, we
do not nd any e¤ect of the US exports rent on the Canadian MFN tari¤s in the remaining
80% of the industries. This partial evidence of trade cooperation is consistent with the ndings
by Lim (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) for the US and the EU, however contrast
with Ketterer, Bernhofen, and Milner (2014), who document deeper Canadian tari¤ reductions
in industries with the US presence. In these studies the identication of the stumbling block
e¤ect relies on whether products are imported from the partner country or not. For FTAs with
small partners there is likely to be enough cross-industry variation in export status to identify
the e¤ect of interest. For the CUSFTA, however, more than 99% of all 6-digit HS products are
exported by the US to Canada, which makes the identication of the stumbling block e¤ect
di¢ cult as it relies on a very small number of industries. Our identication strategy, derived
from the model of cooperative trade policy formation, relies on a richer cross-industry variation
1On the other hand, Karacaovali and Limão (2008) conrmed the presence of rent destruction e¤ectin the
EU trade policy during the Uruguay round of the WTO tari¤ reductions.
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in the preference rent collected by the partner country. This allows us to run a more general
test of the trade policy cooperation hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces a theoretical model
of endogenous trade policy in the presence of an FTA, presenting the results on the e¤ect of
trade agreements on non-cooperative (Section 2.2.1), cooperative (Section 2.2.2), and political
(Section 2.2.3) trade policies. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 develop the analytical framework for
estimating the e¤ect of FTAs on external import tari¤s, and Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 present
regression results and extensions. Finally, section 2.4 concludes with a summary of our ndings.
2.2 The Theory of FTA Trade Policy
In this section we review the main channels identied in the previous literature through which
an FTA may a¤ect external tari¤s of its member countries. We present a simple model of
monopolistic competition with di¤erentiated products and restricted market entry2 to illustrate
those channels and to derive the equilibrium trade policy of an FTA under di¤erent theoretical
assumptions. Predictions of this model will lay foundations for our empirical specications
which we use to estimate the e¤ect of the CUSFTA on the Canadian trade policy.
Consider an economy with three countries indexed by H, P , and F , denoting home, FTA
partner, and the rest of the world, respectively. All countries produce and trade N + 1 goods,
with the rst good being a numeraire, traded at no costs and produced by perfectly competitive
rms. This assumption xes wages at the price of the numeraire good, normalized to 1. For all
other industries i the number of rms in each country j is xed and equals to nij , and each rm
produces a distinct variety of the good. The representative consumer at Home is characterized
by the following quasi-linear utility function:
U(X0; Xi) = X0 +
NX
i=1
ai lnXi;
NX
i=1
ai = 1 (2.1)
where X0 is consumption of the numeraire good. Xi is the constant elasticity of substitution
2All key predictions of this model hold under alternative market structures as long as the terms-of-trade
motive for trade policy is present.
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sub-utility derived from consumption of good Xi:
Xi =
0@ X
j=H;P;F
nijX
f=1
d
1
i
ijfc
i 1
i
ijf
1A
i
i 1
(2.2)
where i is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of product i and dijf denotes the
preference or quality parameter for good i produced by rm f in country j. Suppose that
production costs in country j and industry i are constant and equal to wij and dijf = dij for
all i and j.3 Then the prot-maximizing pricing strategy that rm f in industry i sets in the
Home country market is
pijf =

i
i   1

(wij +  ij) (2.3)
where  ij is the specic tari¤ imposed by the home country government on imports of good
i from country j with  iH = 0. National welfare W , dened as the indirect utility of the
representative consumer, is the sum of consumer surplus from consumption of di¤erentiated
goods (CS), tari¤ revenue (TR), and prots of domestic rms (H):4
W0 () = CS() + TR() + H() (2.4)
CS() = U(X0; Xi; ) 
P
j;i;f pijfcijf
TR() =
P
j=P;F
P
i;f  ijfcijf
H() =
P
i;f i;H;f ( i) =
P
i;f
pi;H;fxi;H;f ( i)
i
where  is 2N  1 vector of endogenously determined import tari¤s set by the home country
government according to some objective function. A common problem in the theoretical liter-
ature is that this objective function is unknown and what one assumes about the governments
preferences may have important implications for the equilibrium trade policy. In what follows,
we consider several specications of the governments objective function most commonly used
in the literature and then rely on empirical analysis to di¤erentiate amongst the alternative
specications.
3This assumption implies that all rms within each country and industry are symmetric in terms of the costs
structure and consumers demand.
4Labor income is normalized to one and is omitted from the expression for welfare for simplicity.
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2.2.1 Non-cooperative trade policy of an FTA
A large body of literature on FTAs with endogenous trade policy assumes that governments
of FTA member countries have no political economy motivations and set import tari¤s non-
cooperatively. With the governments objective function being equal to national welfare,
G0 () = W0 (), the resulting equilibrium ad-valorem import tari¤ tFit for imports of prod-
uct i in year t from country F will maximize national welfare (2.4) and will take the form5
"it
F
it = (i   1)sPittPit +
i   1
i
sHit (2.5)
where "i is the price elasticity of import demand at Home, tPit is the preferential ad-valorem
tari¤ rate on imports from the partner country, and sjit is the share of the Home countrys
market supplied by rms from country j = H;P . The rst term on the right-hand side shows
that the FTAs external and internal tari¤s are positively related. This result was rst obtained
by Richardson (1993) and later termed as the tari¤ complementaritye¤ect due to Bagwell and
Staiger (1997b). Intuitively, a decline in the tari¤ rate towards the FTA partner country reduces
imports from the ROW, thus reducing tari¤ revenue proportional to the partner countrys
market share sPi . Furthermore, the tari¤ revenue e¤ect is stronger if varieties imported from the
partner country and from the ROW exports are close substitutes. The second term on the right-
hand side reects the governments incentives to protect imperfectly competitive industries.
This term stems from governments incentives to use trade policy in order to shift consumer
expenditure from foreign to domestic producers because only prots of the latter enters the
expression for national welfare and the governments objective function. Since the size of
the market share of domestic rms a¤ects the share of consumersexpenditure redirected to
domestic producers, the strength of the reallocating e¤ect of an import tari¤ is proportional to
sHit . Moreover, the ability of trade policy to redistribute expenditure from foreign to domestic
varieties is stronger when these varieties are close substitutes.
5See Technical Appendix (B) for complete derivation.
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2.2.2 Cooperative trade policy of an FTA
The literature based on cooperative tari¤ formation has di¤erent predictions about the e¤ect of
an RTA on external tari¤s. Using di¤erent theoretical frameworks, Kennan and Riezman (1990),
Bagwell and Staiger (1997a), Bagwell and Staiger (1997b), and Ornelas (2007a) show that
members of customs unions (CU), which set the common external tari¤ (CET) cooperatively
in order to maximize the joint welfare of the union, tend to increase the MFN tari¤ relative to
pre-CU level. There are two main contributing factors to the protectionist trade policies of a
CU. Firstly, there is the terms of trade argument that arises from an increase in the economic
size of the trading block, which in turn increases its market power and thereby allows member
countries to redistribute surplus from their non-member trading partners. Secondly, CUs tend
to have higher tari¤s because their members take into account the e¤ect of a CET on each
others welfare. The cooperative trade policy of a CU internalizes the positive e¤ect of a CET
on export rents within the block, thus making CUs more protective than FTAs.
While the rst factor simply reects the increasing market power of the trading bloc, the
second factor illustrates the role of cooperation on trade policy issues. When members of
the trading block coordinate their trade policies, as they do in CUs, then the resulting trade
policy becomes more protectionist as the member countries internalize the externalities created
by their trade policies. Of course, one can argue that members of an FTA may not have
enough incentive to cooperate on their trade policies, whereas countries in a CU are forced to
cooperatively choose their CET. However, several recent studies have suggest that this may be
the case. The theoretical model of an RTA, constructed by Limao (2007), features a public
good supplied by individual countries which generates positive regional spillover. In his model,
preferential tari¤s can be used indirectly to forge cooperation on non-trade issues between RTA
partners and to address the problem of underprovision of the public good with cross-border
spillover e¤ects. Accordingly, RTA members want to maintain their preference margins by
keeping the MFN tari¤ high in order to stimulate economic and political involvement of their
partners in non-trade issues, thus internalizing the decision on the provision of the regional
public good.
We model trade policy cooperation by assuming that FTA member countries take into
account the e¤ect of their trade policies on each other and set import tari¤s in order to maximize
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the sum of their welfare. With segmented markets, the objective function of the home country
government becomes the sum of national welfare and prots earned by the partner countrys
rms:
G1 () =W0 () + bP () = CS + TR+
X
i
(niHiH + bniPiP ) (2.6)
Parameter b 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of trade policy cooperation between the two countries.
When b = 0, G1 () = G0 () and there is no trade policy cooperation. When b = 1, home
country policymakers internalize the e¤ect of  on partner countrys welfare completely. Dif-
ferentiating the wights on foreign and domestic welfare in the objective function allows us to
empirically test the trade cooperation hypothesis against the alternative of no cooperation.
In the presence of trade policy cooperation, the equilibrium import tari¤ with and without
the agreement becomes:6
"it
F
i = (i   1) tPi siP +
i   1
i
siH + b
i   1
i
siP with FTA
"it
F
i = (i   1) tPi siP +
i   1
i
siH   bi   1
i

siP
siP + siF

without FTA
and the e¤ect of the agreement on the MFN tari¤ is
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(2.7)
As long as FTA member countries cooperate their policies, there is an additional stumbling
block e¤ect of an FTA (the last term on the right-hand side of equation 2.7). This e¤ect
originates from the incentive of the home countrys government to maintain a large enough
preference margin for the partner by increasing the MFN tari¤ subsequent to FTA formation
(or by decreasing it insubstantially).
2.2.3 Trade policy of an FTA under political economy
Our third empirical specication follows from a political economy model of trade policy proposed
by Grossman and Helpman (1994). This model departs from welfare maximizing trade policy
6See Technical Appendix (B) for complete derivation.
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and assumes instead that governments choose the level of tari¤s in order to maximize the
weighted sum of national welfare W and political contributions C provided by domestic special
interest groups:
G2() = aW1() + C (2.8)
where W1() is national welfare as dened in the previous section and a > 0 is the weight
that government attaches to one dollar of welfare relative to one dollar of contributions. As
in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that some domestic industries are politically
organized and provide the government with contribution schedules, which are contingent on its
choice of trade policy, while others are not and do not participate in the tari¤-setting process.
Let Ii be an indicator variable which takes the value of one if industry i is organized or zero
otherwise. Then the objective of the home country government is to choose  which maximizes
G2() = aW1() +
X
i
IiCi() (2.9)
Grossman and Helpman (1994) show that with truthful contribution schedules, the optimum
trade policy choice maximizes the preference-weighted sum of national welfare and welfare of
organized interest groups, which includes prots, consumer surplus and their share in redistrib-
uted tari¤ revenue. In the presence of a preferential trade regime between countries H and P ,
the equilibrium tari¤ imposed on imports from country F takes the following form:
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where  is the share of population represented by one of the lobbying groups. The third term
on the right-hand side measures the e¤ect of domestic lobbying on the MFN tari¤. The positive
coe¢ cient implies that MFN tari¤s are higher in industries with the presence of domestic
lobbying.7 As with the second term, the redistributive power of import tari¤s depends on the
7 It is important to note that under the assumption that all industries are politically organized (Ii = 1 for all
i), used in most of the political economy of trade literature, equation (2.10) becomes
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and the e¤ect of lobbying cannot be identied separately from the market structure e¤ect in the regression
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share of domestic rms in the market and on the degree of product di¤erentiation. Equation
(2.10) states that there is an additional channel for the e¤ect of an FTA on the MFN tari¤. Since
the strength of domestic lobbying is proportional to sHit , an FTA and the following reduction in
the market share of domestic rms will weaken lobbying power of the industry and reduce its
lobbying intensity for protection. This additional pro-liberalization e¤ect of trade agreements
was rst identied by Ornelas (2005b) who demonstrated that FTAs erode protection rent
enjoyed by home country rms.
2.3 Empirical implementation
2.3.1 Econometric specications
Equations (2.5), (2.7), and (2.10) summarize three main channels for the e¤ect of an FTA on
trade policies of member countries and motivate our main empirical specications. After the
introduction of an error term to the most parsimonious model, which excludes cross-border
externalities and political economy factors, the empirical specication based on model (2.5)
becomes:8
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where i and t are industry and year xed e¤ects which capture the inuences of time- and
industry-invariant factors that are not present in the theoretical model but may a¤ect trade
policy formation. Given that the model is static and does not inform us about the dynamic
response of MFN tari¤s to changes in the right-hand side variables, we apply two alternative
time-di¤erence operators in order to identify coe¢ cients 1 and 2:
Yit = + 1X
1
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2X
2
it 1 + t + uit (2.12)
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1
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2
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analysis.
8We exclude i from X1t in the estimation equation to reduce the chance of having a measurement error.
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Equation (2.12) is in rst di¤erences and measures short-term relationship between MFN and
preferential tari¤s (all explanatory variables are lagged by one year to allow for a small delay
in response in the dependant variable). Although CUSFTA tari¤ cuts took place between
1989 and 1998 whilst most of the MFN tari¤ reductions, negotiated at the Uruguay Round of
the WTO, occurs after 1995, there is still enough variation in both variables prior to 1995 to
identify the presence of short-term response in MFN tari¤s to CUSFTA trade liberalization.9
Yet, Canada does not change its import tari¤s frequently and it may take more than one
year for the MFN tari¤ to react to changes in the market environment. Therefore, our second
empirical specication is equation (2.11) di¤erenced over the entire time period of the CUSFTA
trade liberalization in order to estimate the long-term response of the MFN tari¤s to variation
in the right-hand side variables.10 While model (2.12) can provide important information on
short-term adjustments in trade policy to preferential liberalization, the more general long-run
model (2.13) will be used to gauge the overall e¤ect of the CUSFTA on Canadian multilateral
tari¤ changes during the Uruguay Round of the WTO tari¤ reductions.11
Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008), henceforth EFO, use the intuition behind equi-
librium import tari¤ (2.5) in order to test the reduced form relationship between external and
internal tari¤s for a group of Latin American countries. Their ndings conrm that tari¤ pref-
erences within RTAs are inversely related to changes in MFN tari¤ rates. Before presenting
results for the structural estimation, we will start with the empirical specication similar to the
one suggested by EFO and examine the response of Canadian MFN tari¤s to preferential tari¤
cuts on US imports:
tFit = + 0t
P
i;t 1 + t + uit (2.14)
9More than half of the variation in MFN tari¤s during 1990-1994 time period occurs within industry, com-
paring to three quarters for the time period 1995-1998. These fractions are very similar when calculated using
10-digit HS industry classication at which commodity tari¤s are dened. Although the overall variation in
MFN tari¤s after 1995 is four times greater than before, we believe it is enough to identify 1 and 2 on both
subsamples. In the Section 2.3.5 we report results estimated from the two subsamples separately.
10There can be a concern about endogeneity that arises from elasticity in the dependent variable because
elasticity may determine market shares. We address this concern by using a number of di¤erent instrument
variables for market shares. For example, factor endowments, used as instruments for Canadian market shares,
should be independent of elasticity and external policy, and at the same time provide exogenous variation in the
Canadian market shares. Details about other instrument variables are provided in section 2.3.2.
11The negotiation of CUSFTA began in the mid-80s before it became e¤ective on Jan 2nd 1988, so the reduction
of preferential tari¤ is predetermined before the Uruguay Round in 1995. Therefore the reduction of preferential
tari¤ should be exogenous to the Uruguay Round.
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Since tari¤preferences to a partner country reduce socially optimal external tari¤s both through
the tari¤ revenue e¤ect (X1it) and through the market structure e¤ect (X
2
it), we expect 0 > 0.
Positive 0 would imply that reductions in preferential tari¤ are followed by MFN tari¤ cuts
and support the tari¤ complementarity hypothesis.
The intuition for the test of the trade policy cooperation hypothesis comes from equation
(2.7). When countries set their trade policies cooperatively, an FTA will have an additional
positive e¤ect on the MFN tari¤ which operates through two channels. First, cooperation
implies lower tari¤s in industries with large US market shares prior to the establishment of
an FTA, and this e¤ect vanishes once US rms receive preferential market access in Canada.
Second, MFN tari¤s generate rent to the partner country rms under the FTA so that the home
country government will tend to provide more protection to industries which yield more rent
to the partner countrys rms. Together, these two e¤ects induce an increase in the external
tari¤s amongst industries that have a large US presence in the Canadian market.
However, with trade policy restrictions imposed by the WTO, identication of cooperation
in trade policy from equation (2.7) becomes problematic. First, the WTO tari¤ ceiling binding
will either prevent tari¤s from raising entirely or narrow the scope for increase to the gap
between the binding and the applied tari¤ rates. Second, at the Uruguay Round (UR) of the
WTO negotiations, the Canadian government committed to a 33% reduction in the average
MFN tari¤ between 1995 and 1999, and by 1999 the applied MFN tari¤ rate had increased
in only 3% of all industries relative to pre-CUSFTA levels. These two exogenous constraints
on tari¤ adjustments imply that the e¤ect of trade policy cooperation on changes in the MFN
rates may not propagate through the US market share in the way predicted by equation (2.7).12
To identify the trade policy cooperation e¤ect, we rely on the variation in MFN tari¤s
generated by the UR of tari¤ reductions. By varying the depth of tari¤ cuts across industries,
countries had a considerable degree of exibility in achieving the UR target of the reduction in
the average MFN tari¤ by one-third. Although a common presumption is that the GATT trade
liberalization is based on reciprocity, Finger, Reincke, and Castro (2002) point out that there
12 It is important to note that the two other three e¤ects of FTA on external tari¤s studies in this paper are
negative and can thus be identied in the presence of ceiling tari¤ bindings.
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was no specic formula applied to achieve the average tari¤ reduction target, giving negotiators
some freedom in applying discretionary tari¤ cuts in di¤erent industries. Since tari¤ concessions
are the outcome of a bargaining process in which every country protects its national interests,
negotiators would trade-o¤ interests of di¤erent industries and could extend protection to some
industries at expense of deeper concessions in others. Therefore, the observed tari¤ concessions
must reect those national interests, and in particular the trade cooperation motive, if it is
present in the objective function of a policymaker.
To understand how tari¤ concessions will di¤er across industries in the presence of trade
policy cooperation, we di¤erentiate the rent earned by the partner country exports to the home
country with respect to the MFN tari¤:
b
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is the elasticity of the price index with respect to the MFN tari¤. The MFN
tari¤ a¤ects a partner countrys export rent through i (when i is large, tari¤s have stronger
e¤ect on foreign rmsprices), elasticity of substitution (large i implies stronger redistributive
e¤ect of price changes on consumer expenditure), and the value of imports from the partner
country (niP piP qiP ). Therefore, when b > 0 and the partner countrys rents enter the objective
function of the home countrys policymaker, a commitment to reduce the average MFN tari¤ by
a certain amount will stimulate the home country to cut tari¤s deeper in industries with smaller
imports from the partner country, all else being equal. This is because in those industries a
given preference margin applies to a smaller volume of exports and as such generates less rent
to the partner country. In the absence of reliable data on the elasticity of substitution and price
elasticity with respect to tari¤, we rely on the variation in the value of US exports to identify
the e¤ect of trade policy cooperation.
The above result implies that if cooperation motives are present in the objective function
of a policymaker, they should only play a role in industries where the partner country earns
non-zero rent. We therefore introduce an indicator variable Dit which takes the value of one
for goods imported from the US in specications (2.12) and (2.13):
Yit = + 0Dit + 1X
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As with equations (2.12) and (2.13), the model (2.16) is estimated using short and long time
di¤erencing. If b > 0; we would expect to nd 0 < 0. It should be emphasized that this test is
identical to Lim (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) who derive the relationship between
tari¤ reduction and preferential import indicator variables from the model where countries
choose cooperative tari¤ rates in order to generate more rent to their FTA partner and to
stimulate provision of the regional public good.
However, our preferred method for estimating the stumbling block e¤ect is di¤erent from
model (2.16) for two reasons. First, Canadian imports from the US are positive for nearly 99%
of all 6-digit HS industries and identication of coe¢ cient 0 relies on too few observations.
Second, in the presence of trade policy cooperation we would expect sectors with greater US
involvement to observe less trade liberalization since the tari¤ concessions in those industries
have stronger negative impact on the partners export rent. Therefore, we di¤erentiate indus-
tries according to their importance for US exports to Canada, and estimate the relationship
between the volume of exports and trade liberalization along the distribution of the share of
each industry in total US exports to Canada. In particular, we use quintiles of the distribution
of the US export share to Canada to categorize industries into ve groups. Denoting by Dkit a
dummy variable which takes the value of one if industry i falls into k-th quintile, the empirical
specication becomes as follows:13 ;14
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If tari¤ cooperation exists in the CUSFTA, industries that have higher US representation should
receive more protection against foreign competition in the Canadian market. Thus, we expect
13We also experimented with the interactions of Dkit and preferential tari¤ changes to check if the e¤ect of the
terms-of-trade channel varies across industries with di¤erent US exports. Since these interactions are insignicant
in all of our specications, we do not report the results in the paper but they are available upon request.
14 It is important to note that while the empirical specication (2.17) is di¤erent from Lim (2006) and Kara-
caovali and Limão (2008), introduction of the regional public good in our theoretical model will lead to the same
prediction that industries with more imports from the US should experience smaller MFN tari¤ reductions. In
Venables and Limao (2002) model Home country and the rest of the world negotiate multilateral tari¤ coopera-
tively in order to maximize joint welfare. Under this assumption, the e¤ect of tari¤ preferences on public good
provision is positive only for the corner case when the preferential tari¤ rate is zero and can thus be empirically
estimated only for a subset of industries with free trade between FTA partners. In the absence of multilateral
tari¤ negotiations, as in the case of our model, the e¤ect of tari¤ preferences on the public good provision by the
partner will be increasing in the US revenue from exporting to Canada. Derivations are available upon request.
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all i to be negative which would imply that industries that contribute the most to the US
exports to Canada are the least liberalized ones (the omitted category is industries with the
largest US exports to Canada). Moreover, if industries with larger export shares tend to be
more protected, we would expect to nd the following ranking of k coe¢ cients:
k 1 < k < 0;8k = 2; 3; 4 (2.18)
Therefore, since the US exports to Canada are positive for nearly all 6-digit HS product cate-
gories, we use equation (2.17) to identify the cross-industry variation in the strength of the trade
policy cooperation e¤ect which varies with the partner countrys gain from tari¤ preferences.
Finally, to arrive at our most complete empirical specication with political economy factors,
we rearrange equation (2.10) by adding xed e¤ects and time di¤erencing it:
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where X3it = Iis
H
it . Positive coe¢ cient 3 would imply that while politically organized industries
tend to receive more protection from policymakers in general, a reduction in the domestic market
share, triggered by the partner countrys preferential market access, would cause deeper tari¤
cuts in those industries.15 The reason for deeper tari¤ cuts is that FTAs lead to a reduction
in protectionist rent retained by domestic rms since a part of this rent will be netted by the
partner countrys rms. This rent destructione¤ect, originally identied by Ornelas (2005b),
weakens the incentives of domestic rms to lobby for protection and results in lower levels of
external tari¤s by moderating political economy distortions.
2.3.2 Estimation issues
Since we are interested in establishing a causal e¤ect of the CUSFTA on Canadian multilat-
eral trade liberalization, it is important to discuss endogeneity concerns with preferential trade
15Most of the previous empirical literature, e.g. Karacaovali and Limão (2008) and Ketterer, Bernhofen, and
Milner (2014), assumed that all industries are equally active in lobbying. Under this assumption, X1it = X
3
it,
making it impossible to identify separately the market structure and political economy e¤ects.
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liberalization measures and the ways of dealing with them. Preferential tari¤ cuts is the pri-
mary concern for potential endogeneity. The CUSFTA came into force on January 1, 1989,
and resulted in the elimination of nearly all tari¤s by 1998. Trade liberalization between the
two countries followed tari¤ reduction schedules, which were adopted in 1986-1987 when the
CUSFTA was negotiated. Given that most MFN tari¤ cuts took place after 1995, preferential
tari¤ reductions can be viewed as predetermined relative to subsequent MFN tari¤s and the
reverse causation from multilateral to preferential trade policy is unlikely. While there can be
other factors a¤ecting both preferential and MFN tari¤s, such as industry-specic variation in
economic and political conditions, to the extent that the Canadian government committed itself
to removing tari¤s on US imports entirely, preferential tari¤ cuts seem to be a priori exogenous
to variation in MFN tari¤s.
However, there is one caveat that should be kept in mind when preferential tari¤ cuts are
viewed as exogenous. The fact that tari¤s were completely eliminated by 1998 implies that
in specications with changes over the entire CUSFTA phase-out period, tP will be highly
collinear with the initial MFN tari¤ rate and may thus capture the ease of tari¤ cut implemen-
tation. This should be less of a problem in structural specications where the interaction of
tP with the US market share captures the economic value of tari¤ complementarity e¤ect for
tari¤ revenue. Yet, as a robustness test, we also run specications where tP and X1 enter
separately to isolate the e¤ect of the FTA on the governments economic incentives to change
external tari¤s from the e¤ect of initial tari¤ rate on exibility of trade policy adjustment. In
general, however, the causal interpretation of our results should be treated with caution in the
absence of good instruments for preferential tari¤ changes.
The indicator variables for the US presence in the Canadian market can also be endogenous
due to the reverse causation since the decision to export to Canada and the share of industry
in total US exports may depend on the preference margin. To deal with the endogeneity of
the FTAs partner export dummy variable, we follow Limao (2006) and use the instrumental
variable approach. The rst instrument for Dit is the dummy variable which takes the value of
one for products exported by the US to Canada in 1988, the last year before the rst round of the
CUSFTA tari¤ cuts, which makes this instrument independent of tari¤ preferences. Our second
instrument is the dummy variable which takes the value of one for products exported by the US
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to the ROW in 1988. This is a valid instrument because, on one hand, the US export structure to
other countries prior to the CUSFTA formation is independent of Canadian trade policy during
the years 1989-1998, and, on the other hand, positively correlated with the structure of the US
exports to Canada. The third instrument is the change in the world price for product i, which
is measured as the absolute change in price in the previous year for the short-run specications
and as a change between 1989 and 1994 for the long-run specications. While correlated with
incentives to export, world price changes occurring prior to the decision to adjust MFN tari¤s
are likely to be exogenous. Using the same logic, we use quintile dummies for product i in year
1988 and their interactions with price changes as dened above to instrument Dkit variables.
Quintile dummies constructed for 1988 represent valid instruments for Dkit because ranking of
industriesin US exports to Canada prior to CUSFTA formation is independent of subsequent
MFN tari¤ changes but is highly correlated over time. When interacted with price changes,
these variables capture transitions across quintiles of the US export share distribution over time
due to exogenous changes in the world prices.
Another challenge with the estimation of equations (2.19) and (2.20) is the endogeneity
problem arising from the simultaneity of market shares and the MFN tari¤ rate. We address
this problem by using a number of di¤erent instrumental variables for sHit and s
P
it suggested
by previous literature. For the Canadian market share, the list of instruments includes factor
shares of physical capital, non-production labour, intermediate inputs, and fuel and electricity
in industrys output using 6-digit NAICS industry classication. Treer (1993) suggests that
industrys factor endowments are independent of the level of protection and thus provide exoge-
nous variation in the Canadian market share. As an additional instrument, we use the revealed
comparative advantage index proposed by Balassa (1965).16 An increase in the revealed com-
parative advantage index would imply an increase in the competitiveness of Canadian rms,
and one would expect to see an increase in the share of domestic rms and a decrease in the
share of foreign rms in the Canadian market. At the same time, we found no evidence that
16The revealed comparative advantage index is constructed at the product level as RCAit =
Xit=jXjt
Zit=jXjt
, where
Xit is Canadian exports of good i in year t to all countries other than US, and Zit is the corresponding level
of exports by all other countries to all destinations excluding the US. The US market is excluded from the
calculation since US tari¤ preferences for Canada, determined simultaneously with Canadian preferences for the
US, could have changed the structure of the Canadian exports. In the empirical analysis we use a symmetric
index of revealed comparative advantage: RSCAit = RCAit 1RCAit+1 2 [ 1; 1].
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Canadian tari¤ preferences for the US products are related in any systematic way to the growth
rate of Canadian exports to other countries, thus there are no reasons to believe that the re-
vealed comparative advantage index is a¤ected by the Canadian MFN tari¤.17 Similarly, the
index of the US revealed comparative advantage in the world market, excluding Canada, is used
to instrument the share of US rms in the Canadian market.
To address the issue of measurement error in the political organization dummy variables,
constructed from an indirect measure of lobbying activity and discussed in details in the next
section, we follow the general approach in the political economy literature by instrumenting
them with the market concentration ratio and with the log of average scale. Equation (2.19) and
(2.20) are estimated by 2-step GMM and all instruments which do not pass the orthogonality to
the structural error test at a 95% condence level are excluded from the rst stage regression.
Since both equations are non-linear in endogenous variables, we also include the cross product
of instruments for market shares and political organization dummy variables in the list of
instruments.18 Similarly, to instrument X1it we use the cross-products of instruments for s
P
it
and the preferential tari¤ changes, treating the latter as exogenous. All empirical specications
include Canadian tari¤ rate in 1988 as an additional regressor to control for the cross-industry
variation in the scope of the MFN tari¤ reductions.
2.3.3 Data
The data used for this paper come from several di¤erent sources and cover the time period
from 1989 to 1998, which is the entire phase-out period of import tari¤s under the CUSFTA.
While trade data is available at 6-digit HS product classication, all industry-level data is only
available at 6-digit NAICS. We keep the data at the 6-digit HS classication, and whenever
data are available only at a higher level of aggregation, it is replicated for all 6-digit HS codes
within the corresponding aggregate industry.19 Canadian import and tari¤ data are obtained
17Bown and Crowley (2007 JIE), however, document positive e¤ect of US antidumping duties against China
on Chinese exports to other countries. Therefore, in our empirical analysis we pay close attention to the validity
of the exclusion restriction tests.
18Wooldridge (2010) shows that cross-products of two sets of exogenous variables are the most relevant instru-
ments when dealing with the product of two endogenous variables.
19For this reason, in all regressions where industry-level data is used the standard errors are clustered at the
6-digit NAICS level.
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from Statistics Canada at HS-6 level. Import tari¤s are constructed as a ratio of import duties
over the value of imports.20 The data on output, capital, employment, intermediate inputs, and
fuel and electricity consumption is also provided by Statistics Canada. It is recorded at 6-digit
NAICS, and we use concordance provided by Industry Canada to make it compatible with the
6-digit HS classication. The home countrys market shares were constructed at 6-digit NAICS
level as the value of industry shipments (net of exports) relative to total consumption (total
shipments minus net exports). The US market share is constructed similarly as the ratio of
Canadian imports from the US relative to domestic consumption. The data on Canadian, US,
and the ROWs exports, used in the construction of revealed comparative advantage indices,
come from the World Banks World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, and is recorded
at a 6-digit HS classication. Elasticities of substitution for Canada, i, were obtained from
Broda, Greeneld, and Weinstein (2006b) at 3-digit HS industry classication. Import demand
elasticities were obtained from LooiKee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009) at 6-digit HS level.
Table 2:1 provides the summary statistics for the key variables in this study. The average
MFN tari¤ is 5:7% and the average preferential tari¤ is 2:5% during the phase out period,
suggesting that the average preferential margin is equal to 3:2%. The average annual reduction
in the MFN tari¤ is 0:4%, which is 0:3 percentage points less than the average reduction in
the preferential tari¤. The mean value for the Canadian home market share decreased by
approximately 1% annually, from 63% in 1990 to 53% in 1998. During the same period, the US
market share in Canada increased by 1% annually, from 21% in 1990 to 29% in 1998.
To construct political organization dummy variables we use data from Stoyanov (2009) and
then apply di¤erent approaches to categorize industries into politically organized and unorga-
nized ones. The data include information on lobbyists o¢ cially registered with the Canadian
Registrar of Lobbyists, the subject-matter for communicating with government o¢ cials, and
the rms which recruited them. Working with only those lobbyists who contact policymakers
regarding international trade policy issues allows us to construct political economy variables
with a more pronounced relationship to trade policy formation. Each rm is assigned to one
6-digit NAICS industry based on its primary manufacturing activity. We then calculate the
20Since this is not a perfect measure of import tari¤s, we exclude 1% of observations with the highest MFN
and preferential tari¤s from the data to minimize the risk of measurement error.
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total number of lobbyists representing interests of each 6-digit NAICS industry. Since the the-
ory is not very informative about how to classify industries into politically active or non-active,
we, thus, construct four di¤erent measures of industrial political organization to analyze the
sensitivity of estimation results to the formulation of this generated variable. In our rst two
measures, we classify an industry as politically active (Ii = 1) if it is represented by at least one
and at last three lobbyists, respectively. The summary statistics for these two dummy variables,
I1 and I2, is presented in Table 2:1.
To build our third measure of political activity, we follow Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000b) and regress the number of lobbyists in an industry on the import penetration ratio
interacted with a 3-digit NAICS dummy variables and a constant term.21 All industries with
positive coe¢ cients on these interactions are dened as politically active. The intuition behind
this denition of political organization is that industries threatened more by import competition
will seek greater protection from the government. We label this variable as I3.
In construction of the fourth measure of political organization dummy, we follow Matschke
(2008) in which the number of lobbyists is regressed on the deadweight loss of protection
(normalized by the value added) interacted with 3-digit NAICS dummies. As with the previous
measure, all industries with positive coe¢ cients are assumed to be politically organized (I4 = 1),
while others are not. This specication is motivated by the theoretical prediction that in
industries with larger welfare losses from protection domestic interest groups should spend
more resources on lobbying and recruit more lobbyists.
The last mechanism for constructing political organization relies on the rates of Canadian
preferential liberalization. Tari¤ reduction schedules between Canada and the US classied all
products into three categories. Tari¤s on products in the rst category were eliminated entirely
in the rst year of the agreement, and tari¤s for the other two groups were eliminated in equal
annual stages over ve and ten years, respectively. Assuming that the most politically active
industries would be sheltered by more protectionist tari¤ reduction schedules, we classify all
industries in the third category as politically organized. In other words, we use information on
21Since we do not model endogenous lobby formation, we do not allow industrial political activity to vary over
time. Hence, in construction of the third and fourth measures of political organization we use the data for 1988
and then extrapolate the results for the rest of the sample. Focusing on the lobbying stucture in the year leading
up the the CUSFTA formation has the advantage that these measures of lobbying activity are unlikely to be
driven by factors related to the agreement.
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the observed changes in trade policy to reveal sensitiveindustries, which makes this measure
better connected to lobbying for trade policy than the ones based on lobbyist headcount. At
the same time, we should keep in mind that industries may be sensitive for a variety of factors
unrelated to lobbying.
2.3.4 Estimation Results
In this section, we present the estimation results for the empirical models described in Section
2.3.1 and discuss the implications of each of them.
Table 2:2 presents short-run estimation results for reduced form specication (2.14). The
positive and statistically signicant estimate of 1 coe¢ cient in column (1) supports the tari¤
complementarity hypothesis and indicates that tari¤ preferences granted to the US are as-
sociated with reductions in the MFN tari¤ rate in the following year. The estimate of 0:1053
implies that every one percentage point reduction in preferential tari¤s is associated with 0:1053
percentage points reduction in the MFN tari¤s, which is nearly identical to the estimates of
0:1 0:12 obtained by EFO for Latin American countries in comparable empirical specications.
If one believes that the tari¤ preference schedules, negotiated in 1987-88, are pre-determined,
then this relationship can be considered casual unless there are some dynamic factors which
had a¤ected the CUSFTA negotiations in 1980s and the propensity to liberalize MFN tari¤s
in 1990s. Applying our results for an average industry, the reduction in preferential tari¤ rates
caused an additional annual reduction in the MFN rate by 0:08 percentage points and can
explain almost 20% of the overall MFN tari¤ cuts between 1989 and 1998.
To test the hypothesis that Canadian MFN tari¤ reductions in 1990s were set cooperatively
with the US, we regress annual changes in the MFN tari¤on the indicator variableDit in column
(2). Canadian preferential tari¤s provide US rms with a competitive advantage against rms
from outside of the CUSFTA. Therefore, if the CUSFTA trade policy is set cooperatively,
the Canadian government would rely upon trade policy to protect the interests of US rms
in Canada and we would expect to observe slower MFN tari¤ reductions in industries with
larger share of imports from the US. The OLS estimate of the coe¢ cient on Dit in column
(2) is insignicant, both statistically and economically, which does not support the hypothesis
of cooperative trade policy. However, as it was discussed previously, the construction of this
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variable may result in a specication problem since for more than 99% of all industry-year
observations there is a positive value of Canadian imports from the US. Hence, there may
not be enough variation in Dit to identify the presence of cooperative motives in trade policy
formation.
Column (3) presents results with Dit disaggregated into quintiles of industry is share in
total US exports to Canada. With the fth quintile being the omitted category, we would
expect tari¤s to decrease faster in industries in the rst four quintiles if tari¤s were set coop-
eratively. Indeed, all coe¢ cients are negative but only one of them is statistically signicant
at 85% condence level, providing little evidence of a smaller reduction in Canadian MFN tar-
i¤s in industries which are more important for the US exports. Finally, results of a complete
specication in column (4) suggest that the size of the US industry is not related to the change
in Canadian MFN tari¤s, while tari¤ complementarity e¤ect is still present and statistically
signicant.
The results with IV estimates in columns (5)-(8), which address simultaneity of MFN tari¤s
and import indicator variables Dit and Dkit, also point to the dominance of the building block
e¤ect of the CUSFTA. The coe¢ cient on preferential tari¤ change is nearly the same as in
the OLS specications and is statistically signicant, indicating that every percentage point
increase in tari¤ preferences is associated with around 0:1 percentage points reduction in the
MFN tari¤ in the following year and by 0:179 percentage points over three years (column 8).22
At the same time, the evidence on slower MFN tari¤ reduction in industries which have more
economic signicance for the US is weak as only one of the dummy variables has expected sign
and is statistically signicant.
The results presented so far focus on the reduced-form short-run relationship between MFN
and preferential tari¤s. In Table 2:3 we report the regression results for short-run specications
derived from the theoretical model of an FTA with endogenous trade policy. Column (1) illus-
trates the estimation results for equation (2.12) derived from the model with non-cooperative
trade policy formation (2.5). The positive and statistically signicant estimate of 1 indicates
that a drop in the preferential tari¤ is associated with a reduction in the MFN tari¤. Com-
22The Angrist-Pischke rst stage F-test always rejects the null of weak instruments for all endogenous variables
in all specications at 99% condence level. We also cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of instruments,
suggesting that our instruments are overall of a good quality.
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paring the magnitude of this e¤ect with the one in the reduced-form specication, the two are
qualitatively similar. The coe¢ cient of 1:6817 in column (1) indicates that an average industry
experiences a 0:07 percentage points reduction in the MFN tari¤ per year due to CUSFTA
tari¤ preferences, which accounts for nearly 17% of observed average MFN tari¤ reduction over
the analyzed period. The coe¢ cient on the Canadian market share, which captures the role
of industry structure in imperfectly competitive markets for trade policy, is not statistically
signicant in all specications.
Estimates of the model (2.17) in columns (3) and (4) produce more clear evidence on the
presence of trade policy cooperation between the CUSFTA member countries. Analyzing the
OLS results in column (3), we nd that industries with less exports from the US observe deeper
MFN tari¤ reductions, as predicted by the model with cooperative trade policy. For instance,
the coe¢ cient 1 =  0:0139 implies that industries in the rst quintile of the US import share
distribution experience additional 0:4 percentage points decrease in MFN tari¤ per year relative
to industries in the fth quintile.23 Furthermore, the ranking of k coe¢ cients conrms that
industries contributing relatively more to the US exports to Canada receive smaller reduction
in multilateral tari¤s. In results from IV regressions in column (4) this ranking is not preserved,
however the hypothesis that the industries with less imports from the US are liberalized at a
faster rate still cannot be rejected.24
The results discussed so far suggest that there is a strong contemporaneous relationship
between reductions in MFN and preferential tari¤s. We now turn to estimating the long-term
e¤ect of the CUSFTA on Canadian multilateral tari¤s. In Table 2:4 we report the estimates for
equation (2.15) to see how total changes in MFN tari¤s between 1989 and 1998 were associated
with the overall reduction in preferential tari¤s and the accompanying changes in market shares
over the entire CUSFTA trade liberalization time period. The comparison of the long-run and
short-run elasticities of the MFN tari¤ change with respect to the preferential tari¤ change
reveals considerable di¤erences between them. The coe¢ cient of 0:1996 in the rst column of
Table 2:4 indicates that each percentage point reduction in the preferential tari¤ that took place
23With the mean value for the elasticity-adjustment term i 1
i
i being equal to 3:5, an additional reduction
in the MFN tari¤ for the average industry in the rst quintile is 0:0139
3:5
' 0:004.
24Moreover, the Hausman endogeneity test fails to reject the null hypothesis of endogeneity of Dkit variables
and thus we cannot reject the consistency of the OLS estimates in column (3).
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between 1989 and 1998 is associated with 0:2 percentage points reduction in the multilateral
tari¤, which is nearly twice as large as the short-run elasticity. Results from the structural
estimation, presented in Table 2:5, point to similar conclusion: MFN tari¤ changes are two to
four times more responsive to preferential tari¤ cuts in the long run than in the short run.
Another noticeable di¤erence between the short-run and long-run results are the coe¢ cients
on the US import dummy variables which all turn positive in the OLS regressions. This result
seems to suggest deeper tari¤ cuts in industries with a larger US presence. However, these
aforementioned results should be treated with caution. When the relationship between the MFN
and preferential tari¤s is estimated using the structural model (2.13), the coe¢ cients on Dkit
become negative (Table 2:5, column 3). The likely reason for this is that larger tari¤ preference
may lead to a larger increase in the US presence in Canadian markets, making the MFN import
tari¤ less e¢ cient in protecting domestic producers and, thus, weakening protectionist forces.
Once the e¤ect of the US market share in Canada is controlled for through the X1i variable in
the structural model, the results of the short-run and long-run models become very similar. In
the most complete specication (column (4) of Table 2:5), industries in the rst quintile of the
US export share to Canada experience additional 4:57 percentage point reduction in the MFN
tari¤ relative to industries in the fth quintile over the period 1989-1998. In fact, it is only
20% of industries with the smallest US exports to Canada which observe larger reductions in
the MFN tari¤. The e¤ect of the size of the US exports does not vary across the remaining
industries.
In sum, there is strong evidence that Canadian MFN tari¤ rates feature complementarity
with CUSFTA tari¤ preferences. Reductions in the preferential tari¤ rates are always found
to induce a reduction in the multilateral tari¤s. The evidence on the presence of cooperative
motives in trade policy is less clear though. The OLS results provide strong support for the
hypothesis that Canadian multilateral tari¤s decreased slower in industries which generate
more revenue for US exporters. This suggests that Canadian policymakers at least partially
internalize the e¤ect of MFN tari¤ choice on US producers. The IV results are less conclusive,
but we can never reject the hypothesis that industries in the fth quintile of the US export
share distribution experience greater reductions in the MFN tari¤s than industries in the rst
three quintiles.
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We now turn to empirically testing the nal prediction of the theoretical model concerning
the e¤ect of an FTA on MFN tari¤s in the presence of political economy factors. According
to the model (equation 2.10), an FTA reduces the share of domestic rms in the market due
to an increase in the partner country rmspresence, weakening the redistributive power of
the import tari¤ and reducing the incentive for domestic special interest groups to lobby for
protection. The estimation results of the full model using IV-GMM are presented in Table 2:6.
The rst ve columns report results for the short-run model (2.19) using ve di¤erent measures
of Ii, and the last ve columns report results for the long-run model (2.20).
The estimation results provide no evidence for the e¤ect of the CUSFTA on lobbying for
protection: the estimates of 3 are statistically insignicant and are not robust to the denition
of the political organization. Contrary to the models prediction, a shrinking domestic market
share is not found to be associated with a decline in lobbying power of special interest groups
and a deeper reduction in the level of protection granted to politically organized industries.
The study by Ketterer, Bernhofen, and Milner (2014) also nd no e¤ect of the CUSFTA on
lobbying for protection against outsiders, although they do not attempt to classify industries
by the degree of political organization and simply assume that all industries are equally active
in lobbying.25 It is important to note that although we do not nd support for the hypothesis
of the negative e¤ect of the CUSFTA on lobbying for protection, the power of our test can be
low due to poor measurement of industrial lobbying activity. This problem, which is common
to the political economy of trade literature, can make it di¢ cult to pick up the e¤ect of our
interest in noisy data.26
Turning to other estimates of equations (2.19) and (2.20), they are very similar to our
25 If we also assume that all industries are politically oranized, as in Ketterer, Bernhofen, and Milner (2014)
and Karacaovali and Limão (2008), specication (2.20) becomes
9Yi;98 = + 0Di + 19X
1
i;1998 + (2+3)9X
2
i;1998 + ui
and the e¤ects of lobbying and market structure become separately unidentiable. Under this assumption IV
results in Table 2:5 demonstrate that (2+3) is not statistically di¤erent from zero and do not support the
hypothesis of the e¤ect of the CUSFTA on lobbying for protection.
26Another source of inconsistency with the theory can be the static nature of the PFS model and the long-run
equilibrium analysis and may not be well suited to describe the short-run changes in trade policy. Furthermore,
FTAs may a¤ect lobbying activity through channels other than rent destruction e¤ect. For example, the
estimates may also reect the surge protectionforces as in the model by Imai, Katayama, and Krishna (2009)
where government provides additional protection to politically organized industries when imports surges and the
share of domestic rms in the market decline.
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previously reported ndings. The estimates for 1 are positive and statistically signicant
for all measures of lobbying intensity, pointing to a strong tari¤ complementarity e¤ect: each
percentage point reduction in preferential tari¤ is associated with approximately 0:06 percentage
points reduction in the MFN tari¤ in the short run and 0:31 in the long run.27 This di¤erence in
the elasticities of the MFN tari¤ with respect to preferential tari¤ suggests that a large fraction
of the cumulative e¤ect of a one-o¤ preferential tari¤ cut on the MFN tari¤ rate is spread
across several subsequent years. Taking the sample average of the preferential tari¤ change and
elasticities, the results from column (5) imply a total of 2:21 percentage point reduction in the
MFN tari¤, which accounts for 55% of MFN tari¤ cuts between 1989 and 1998. The coe¢ cient
on the domestic market share, 2, is negative but statistically insignicant in the long-run
specication, indicating that the MFN tari¤s were not adjusted for domestic industries facing
shrinking market shares and that the market structure is not among the main determinants of
the Canadian trade policy.
Consistent with our previous ndings, the coe¢ cient estimates on the US import share
dummy variables Dkit remain negative but only 1 is statistically signicant. This result pro-
vides some support for the cooperative trade policy hypothesis, indicating that Canadian pol-
icymakers were more willing to liberalize industries which play the least important role in the
US exports. To gauge the importance of this factor for the MFN tari¤ changes, we calculate
its implied e¤ect for an average industry in each quintile of the US export share distribution
in our sample. The estimates in column (6) imply that industries in the rst three quintile
of the US export share distribution experienced a respective 4:53, 0:92, and 0:31 percentage
point reduction in MFN tari¤s in addition to the average 2:21 percentage reduction in indus-
tries in the fth quintile. Since we do not nd statistically signicant variation in the rate of
tari¤ reduction across industries in the last fourth quintiles of the US export share distribution,
deeper tari¤ cuts in the rst quintile provide only partial support to the Limaos hypothesis of
cooperation in trade policy in the Canadian context.
Overall, our results reveal that the CUSFTA formation induced more open trade policy
in Canada. The nding of tari¤ complementarity between preferential and MFN tari¤ rates
27With the sample mean value for the elasticity-adjustment term i 1
i
i being equal to 3:5, and the US market
share of 15%, the elasticity of the MFN tari¤ with respect to preferential tari¤ can be calculated as 0:04  1.
57
is very strong and persistent. The implied reduction in the MFN tari¤ in response to a one
percentage point decrease in preferential tari¤ is in the range of 0:3 0:35 percentage points for
an average industry. At the same time, we found only limited support for the trade policies of
CUSFTA member countries to be formed cooperatively. While Canada provides less protection
to industries with the least imports from the US, changes in the MFN tari¤ rates are not
systematically related to export rents generated by those industries to US exporters. Finally,
we do not nd any e¤ect of the CUSFTA on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade
protectionism.
2.3.5 Robustness tests and extensions
In this section we perform several robustness exercises. The rst two columns of Table 2:7 report
estimation results for the short-run and long-run models with 2-digit HS industry xed e¤ects
to control for unobserved industry-specic trends which may be related to the pace of trade
liberalization. We still obtain positive and highly signicant 1 and 1 coe¢ cients, conrming
all of our previous ndings.
As another robustness test, we focus on industries with positive pre-CUSFTA MFN tari¤s
rates. Given that industries with zero initial tari¤s cannot respond to changes in preferential
trade, they do not contribute to the identication of the coe¢ cients of our interest. In columns
(3) and (4) we drop industries with the MFN tari¤ rate in 1988 lower than 1% and it again does
not a¤ect the results. In columns (5) and (6) we estimate the two models on the subsample
of industries for which the CUSFTA tari¤ reductions were scheduled over the entire ten-year
phase-out period. Being the most sensitive product categories, they are also more likely to have
higher initial tari¤s and thus have more room for MFN tari¤ cuts. The results show that the
elasticity of the MFN tari¤ with respect to preferential tari¤ is the same as in the benchmark
specication.28. For this subsample, industries with the least imports from the US experienced
additional 5:1  5:3 percentage points decline in the MFN tari¤ relative to industries in the top
three quintiles of the US import share distribution.
In columns (7) and (8) of Table 2:7 we depart from the strict structure of the theoretical
model and remove elasticity terms from the construction of the right-hand side variable. Al-
28An increase in the 1 coe¢ cient is largely o¤set by a reduction in s
P
it in the estimation sample.
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though there are strong reasons to believe that import demand and substitution elasticities may
play an important role in trade policy by making it more or less distortive, the elasticities are
also likely to be measured with error. Moreover, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000b) found
that the elasticity terms bear little explanatory power for import tari¤s in the protection for
sale model. To make sure that our results are not driven by imprecisely measured elasticities,
we use the MFN tari¤ rate as the dependent variable in these two specications. With this
modication, the estimates are qualitatively similar to those obtained previously, pointing to
the importance of the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect and market shares of US exporters.
As a nal robustness test, we exclude the pre-CUSFTA import tari¤ from the long-run
model. Since CUSFTA member countries had committed to a complete elimination of import
tari¤s by the year 1998, the change in preferential tari¤ between 1989 and 1998 is highly corre-
lated with the starting value of import tari¤, which may cause a high degree of multicollinearity
between the 1988 tari¤ rate and the X1it variable. The results in column (9) reveal a marginal
increase in 1 coe¢ cient, indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem.
2.4 Conclusions
Whether FTAs induce or deter the incentive of member countries for multilateral trade liber-
alization has been a central question in the regionalism literature for the last few decades. So
far, no consensus has been reached on the e¤ect of an FTA membership on external tari¤s.
The theoretical literature on regionalism proposed several channels for the e¤ect of an FTA on
multilateral tari¤s which can rationalize both rises and falls in the level of protectionism fol-
lowing the formation of an agreement. Furthermore, the empirical evidence on the relationship
between FTA membership and an MTL is inconclusive: while some agreements were found to
slow down MTL, others resulted in deeper trade liberalization. Identifying the factors asso-
ciated with one outcome or another is thus an important empirical question. In this paper,
we provide further evidence on the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and
MFN tari¤s by analyzing the e¤ect of the CUSFTA on Canadian external tari¤s. To test this
relationship, we developed a model of endogenous trade policy formation that combines several
forces leading to complementarity and substitutability between FTA internal and external tar-
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i¤s, which allows us to analyze the relative importance of those forces for Canadian MTL in a
unied empirical framework.
The main nding of this paper is that the CUSFTA did in fact facilitate a greater liber-
alization of Canadian multilateral tari¤s. The main factor contributing to complementarity
between preferential and MFN tari¤s operates through the terms-of-trade and tari¤ revenue
e¤ects. We nd that a one percentage point reduction in the Canadian preferential tari¤ rate
leads to a 0:3  0:35 percentage points reduction in the MFN tari¤, which accounts for around
55% of tari¤ decline observed during the Uruguay round of the WTO negotiations. This result
implies that the size of a partner country may play an important role for the e¤ect of an FTA
on incentives to liberalize trade multilaterally, since the e¤ect of an FTA on the terms-of-trade
and tari¤ revenue is small when the partner country is small.
In this study we failed to nd any consistent evidence on the negative impact of the CUSFTA
on the lobbying power of domestic special interest groups. Despite the theoretical prediction
that intensied competition with US rms and declining domestic market share should have
had a negative impact on the return to lobbying activity and reduce incentives for lobbying,
we do not observe deeper tari¤ reductions in industries with strong political connections. Yet,
it is hard to obtain reliable measures of lobbying intensity, and this nding can be derived by
the poor quality of our political economy variables.
Our study also provides weak evidence on the presence of trade policy cooperation between
Canada and the US. We show that industries that generate less export revenue for the US had
experienced deeper tari¤ cuts during the Uruguay round. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that the Canadian government is reluctant to erode the rents of US exporters gen-
erated by their preferential treatment. However, contrary to the tari¤ cooperation hypothesis,
we failed to nd any relationship between changes in MFN tari¤s and US export rents among
industries with large exports to Canada. Overall, the dominance of a tari¤ complementarity
e¤ect of the CUSFTA suggests that the main purpose of the agreement was to exchange market
access between the two countries.
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2.5 Tables and figures 
 
 
Mean
Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximun
Number of
observations
MFN Tariff 0.057 0.064 0 0.249 38,445
Δ(MFN Tariff) -0.004 0.013 -0.068 0.052 38,445
Preferential Tariff 0.025 0.04 0 0.222 38,445
Δ(Preferential Tariff) -0.007 0.011 -0.054 0.031 38,445
Canadian market share 0.578 0.196 0.066 0.999 41,204
Δ(Canadian market share) -0.011 0.032 -0.445 0.445 40,779
US market share 0.253 0.144 0.001 0.797 41,190
Δ(US market share) 0.009 0.026 -0.392 0.376 40,758
I1 0.506 0.501 0 1 243
I2 0.239 0.427 0 1 243
I3 0.235 0.425 0 1 243
I4 0.453 0.499 0 1 243
I5 0.520 0.500 0 1 5020
Import demand elasticity -2.958 4.906 -37.979 -0.213 4,018
Log of firm scale 16.143 1.286 13.593 21.805 243
Material share 0.511 0.118 0.164 0.898 243
Labor share 0.191 0.073 0.015 0.37 243
Non-prod. Labor share 0.202 0.089 0.057 0.594 243
Fuel and electricity share 0.027 0.039 0.001 0.314 243
Table 2.1
Summary statistics for key variables
Notes: Summary statistics is calculated for 6-digit HS industries for the time period 1989-1998. Political
activity indicators I1 and I2 take the value of one if an industry has at least one and three lobbyists,
respectively. Political indicator I3 is constructed as in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and I4 is
constructed as in Matschke (2008). I5 is equal to one for industries which received the most protection
during the CUSFTA grace period. Import demand elasticities are obtained from Kee, Nicita, and
Olarreage (2009).
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
OLS
(4)
OLS
(5)
IV-GMM
(6)
IV-GMM
(7)
IV-GMM
(8)
IV-GMM
Δtariff_us it-1 0.1053*** 0.1054*** 0.0996*** 0.1067***
(6.69) (6.97) (6.92) (6.01)
Δtariff_us it-2 0.0540***
(4.87)
Δtariff_us it-3 0.0316***
(4.59)
US imports indicator (D)† 0.0009 0.0019 -0.0067 0.0358 0.1816**
(0.73) (1.29) (-1.30) (0.90) (2.22)
Exp. Shr, quintile 1 (D1)† -0.0000 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0010
(-0.04) (0.83) (-0.29) (1.45) (1.42)
Exp. Shr, quintile 2 (D2)† -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0014*** -0.0010** -0.0012**
(-1.43) (-0.62) (-2.65) (-2.01) (-2.17)
Exp. Shr, quintile 3 (D3)† -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0000
(-0.71) (-0.12) (-0.79) (-0.57) (-0.01)
Exp. Shr, quintile 4 (D4)† -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0003
(-0.23) (0.38) (-1.14) (-0.99) (-0.74)
R-squared 0.050 0.041 0.041 0.050
Hansen J-statistics, p-val. (a) 0.38 0.68 0.50 0.69
Endogeneity test, p-val. (b) 0.256 0.000 0.006 0.036
N 37,508 38,854 38,854 37,508 37,170 37,170 36,190 28,390
Table 2.2
The determinants of annual change in the MFN tariff
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual change in the MFN tariff. * Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
confidence level. (a) Test for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous. (b) Housman
specification test for endogeneity of variables marked with"†". Under the null hypothesis the variables are exogenous and the OLS is
consistent. Standard errors are clustered at 6-digit NAICS industry level. All specifications include 1988 MFN tariff rate as an additional
control.
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(1)
OLS
(2)
IV-GMM
(3)
OLS
(4)
IV-GMM
L.Δ(US market share×Pref. tariff),(ΔX 1 it-1 )
† 1.682*** 1.684** 1.780*** 1.231*
(3.72) (2.28) (3.92) (1.79)
L.ΔCanadian market share,(ΔX 2 it-1 )
† 0.036 -0.208 0.037 -0.154
(1.09) (-0.91) (1.09) (-1.29)
US imports indicator (D)† 0.028 -1.874
(1.06) (-1.38)
Exp. Shr, quintile 1 (D1)† -0.014*** -0.023**
(-3.12) (-2.08)
Exp. Shr, quintile 2 (D2)† -0.005** 0.006
(-2.11) (0.64)
Exp. Shr, quintile 3 (D3)† -0.003 -0.010*
(-1.47) (-1.71)
Exp. Shr, quintile 4 (D4)† -0.003* 0.006
(-1.72) (1.51)
R-squared 0.018 0.019
Hansen J-statistics, p-val. (a) 0.45 0.69
Endogeneity test, p-val. (b) 0.194 0.237
N 25,193 14,035 25,193 14,035
Table 2.3
Estimation results for the short-run structural model.
Notes: The dependent variable is the elasticity-adjusted annual change in the MFN tariff. * Significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% confident level. (a) Test for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis
is that instruments are exogenous. (b) Housman specification test for endogeneity of variables marked with "†".
Under the null hypothesis the variables are exogenous and the OLS is consistent. Standard errors are clustered at 6-
digit NAICS industry level. All specifications include 1988 MFN tariff rate as an additional control.
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(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
OLS
(4)
OLS
(5)
IV-GMM
(6)
IV-GMM
(7)
IV-GMM
Δtariff_us it 0.120*** 0.201*** 0.205***
(6.34) (5.94) (6.14)
US imports indicator (D)† -0.008 -0.002 -13.119 0.076
(-0.72) (-0.15) (-1.01) (0.32)
Exp. Shr, quintile 1 (D1)† 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.019***
(4.03) (4.20) (5.56) (6.53)
Exp. Shr, quintile 2 (D2)† 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.005
(2.66) (2.88) (0.41) (1.01)
Exp. Shr, quintile 3 (D3)† 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.001
(3.07) (3.29) (0.56) (0.34)
Exp. Shr, quintile 4 (D4)† 0.003* 0.003** 0.002 0.002
(1.75) (2.01) (0.54) (0.57)
R-squared 0.231 0.216 0.225 0.24
Hansen J-statistics, p-val. (a) 0.00 0.22 0.24
Endogeneity test, p-val. (b) 0.365 0.016 0.020
N 3,864 3,887 3,887 3,864 3,785 3,785 3,764
Table 2.4
Estimation results for the reduced-form long-run model
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the MFN tariff between the years 1998 and 1989. * Significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% confidence level. (a) Test for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that
instruments are exogenous. (b) Housman specification test for endogeneity of variables marked with "†". Under the null
hypothesis the variables are exogenous and the OLS is consistent. Standard errors are clustered at 6-digit NAICS industry
level. All specifications include 1988 MFN tariff rate as an additional control.
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(1)
OLS
(2)
IV-GMM
(3)
OLS
(4)
IV-GMM
Δ(US market share×Pref. tariff),(ΔX 1 it )
† 3.947*** 7.577*** 4.011*** 7.821***
(3.63) (3.68) (3.89) (3.61)
ΔCanadian market share,(ΔX 2 it )
† 0.078*** 0.003 0.125*** 0.008
(2.68) (0.01) (3.25) (0.06)
Exp. Shr, quintile 1 (D1)† -0.152*** -0.160**
(-3.38) (-2.02)
Exp. Shr, quintile 2 (D2)† -0.076*** -0.028
(-3.25) (-0.29)
Exp. Shr, quintile 3 (D3)† -0.035* -0.009
(-1.77) (-0.18)
Exp. Shr, quintile 4 (D4)† -0.021* 0.038
(-1.93) (0.96)
R-squared 0.076 0.093
Hansen J-statistics, p-val. (a) 0.73 0.54
Endogeneity test, p-val. (b) 0.003
N 3,178 2,315 3,178 2,315
Table 2.5
Estimation results for the long-run structural model
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the MFN tariff between the years 1998 and 1989. *
Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% confidence level. (a) Test for overidentifying
restrictions. The null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous. (b) Housman specification test for
endogeneity of variables marked with "†". Under the null hypothesis the variables are exogenous and the
OLS is consistent. Standard errors are clustered at 6-digit NAICS industry level. All specifications include
1988 MFN tariff rate as an additional control.
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Model:
(1) (2)
(3)
Short run
(4) (5) (6) (7)
(8)
Long run
(9) (10)
Δ(US market share×Pref. tariff),(ΔX 1 it )
† 1.57** 1.65** 1.52** 1.73*** 1.49** 7.80*** 7.79*** 7.71*** 7.86*** 7.36***
(2.40) (2.55) (2.30) (2.62) (2.25) (3.57) (3.61) (3.58) (3.66) (2.82)
ΔCanadian market share,(ΔX 2 it )
† -0.079 -0.084 -0.163 0.214 -0.227* 0.036 -0.022 -0.028 0.020 -0.099
(-0.52) (-0.85) (-0.96) (0.67) (-1.67) (0.17) (-0.14) (-0.17) (0.13) (-0.34)
Δ(Canadian market share)×I,(ΔX 3 it )
† -0.074 -0.382 -0.095 -0.412 0.328 -0.043 0.101 0.065 -0.029 0.185
(-0.36) (-1.40) (-0.46) (-1.42) (0.92) (-0.21) (0.50) (0.40) (-0.17) (0.49)
Exp. Shr, quintile 1 (D1)† -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.159** -0.166** -0.154** -0.157* -0.151*
(-1.09) (-1.28) (-1.10) (-1.46) (-1.10) (-2.02) (-2.11) (-1.97) (-1.93) (-1.75)
Exp. Shr, quintile 2 (D2)† -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.032 -0.024 -0.016 -0.029 -0.033
(-0.37) (-0.06) (-0.37) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.33) (-0.25) (-0.17) (-0.31) (-0.35)
Exp. Shr, quintile 3 (D3)† -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 -0.009 0.008
(-0.89) (-0.97) (-0.98) (-0.84) (-0.79) (-0.21) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.17) (0.12)
Exp. Shr, quintile 4 (D4)† 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.036 0.037 0.041 0.038 0.043
(0.99) (1.20) (0.93) (0.97) (0.92) (0.85) (0.95) (1.03) (0.98) (1.00)
Hansen J-statistics, p-val. (a) 0.45 0.51 0.53 0.61 0.59 0.56 0.64 0.58 0.51 0.73
Endogeneity test, p-val. (b) 0.367 0.341 0.248 0.374 0.200 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.002
N 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 2,315 2,315 2,315 2,315 2,315
Notes: The dependent variable is the elasticity-adjusted annual change in the MFN tariff. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% confident level. (a) Test
for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous. (b) Housman specification test for endogeneity of variables marked with "†". Under the null
hypothesis the variables are exogenous and the OLS is consistent. Standard errors are clustered at 6-digit NAICS industry level. All specifications include 1988 MFN tariff rate as an
additional control.
Table 2.6
Estimation results for the political economy model (11)
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Model:
(1)
Short run
(2)
Long run
(3)
Short run
(4)
Long run
(5)
Short run
(6)
Long run
(7)
Short run
(8)
Long run
(9)
Long run
Δ(US market share×Pref. tariff),(ΔX 1 it )
† 3.031** 4.828** 1.724*** 7.769*** 2.495*** 11.188** 1.565** 7.796*** 9.341***
(2.32) (2.07) (2.65) (3.03) (3.04) (2.38) (2.40) (3.57) (4.80)
ΔCanadian market share,(ΔX 2 it )
† -0.949 -0.213 0.019 0.050 0.076 0.164 -0.079 0.036 0.017
(-0.44) (-1.08) (0.07) (0.20) (0.16) (0.49) (-0.52) (0.17) (0.08)
Δ(Canadian market share)×I,(ΔX 3 it )
† -0.246 0.282 -0.309 -0.095 -1.106* -0.372 -0.074 -0.043 -0.055
(-0.21) (1.24) (-1.23) (-0.36) (-1.67) (-0.75) (-0.36) (-0.21) (-0.26)
Exp. Shr, quintile 1 (D1)† -0.150* -0.110 -0.009 -0.174** -0.017 -0.186* -0.008 -0.159** -0.162**
(-1.68) (-1.35) (-1.05) (-2.29) (-1.58) (-1.82) (-1.09) (-2.02) (-1.99)
Exp. Shr, quintile 2 (D2)† 0.016 -0.103 -0.007 -0.073 0.006 -0.097 -0.004 -0.032 -0.040
(0.26) (-1.03) (-0.65) (-0.68) (0.62) (-0.77) (-0.37) (-0.33) (-0.41)
Exp. Shr, quintile 3 (D3)† 0.111** 0.016 -0.004 -0.008 -0.012 0.004 -0.005 -0.011 -0.001
(2.00) (0.29) (-0.65) (-0.13) (-1.13) (0.04) (-0.89) (-0.21) (-0.03)
Exp. Shr, quintile 4 (D4)† -0.055 0.009 0.005 0.032 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.036 0.038
(-0.93) (0.21) (1.25) (0.64) (0.10) (0.09) (0.99) (0.85) (0.93)
Condition
No initial
tariff
Hansen J-statistics, p-val. (a) 0.72 0.49 0.83 0.40 0.45 0.56 0.58
Endogeneity test, p-val. (b) 0.466 0.024 0.302 0.216 0.331 0.025 0.002
N 14,035 2,315 11,378 1,895 6,671 1,104 14,035 2,315 2,317
Table 2.7
Robustness tests and extension
Notes: The dependent variable is the elasticity?adjusted change in the MFN tariff. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% confidence level.
(a) Test for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that instruments are exogenous. (b) Housman specification test for endogeneity of variables marked
with “†”. Under the null hypothesis the variables are exogenous and the OLS is consistent. Standard errors are clustered at 6?digit NAICS industry level. Columns
(1)?(8)include 1988 MFN tariff rate as an additional control. Columns (1) and (2) include 2?sigitHS industry fixed effects. Column (3) and (4) exclude industries with
zero MFN tariff in 1988. Column (5) and (6) are estimated on industries with 10?yearphase?outperiods for the CUSFTA preferential tariff reductions. In columns (7)
and (8) the dependent variable is the change in the MFN import tariff.
2-digit HS fixed effects
No industries with zero
tariffs in 1988
Only industries with
gradual preferential
tariff reductions
No elasticities in the
dependent variable
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Chapter 3
Tari¤ Cooperation in Free Trade
Area
3.1 Introduction
Does members in Free Trade Area (FTA) cooperate on their external tari¤policy? This question
is centric to policy makers who want to understand the welfare implications of FTA for its
members. If FTA members cooperate on the level of their external tari¤s, they would behave
similarly to those in Customs Union (CU), and become more protectionist against outsiders after
the formation of the trade agreement.1 As a result, trade creation within the trade bloc can be
plausibly generated at the cost of trade loss from the outsiders of the bloc. Theoretical literature
have shown that FTA leads to further reduction in trade protection among its members but this
result is mainly built on the assumption of non-cooperative policy of FTA members. However,
empirically there has been very little known on this matter.
In this paper, we attempt the empirical study on this matter. To do so, rst we construct a
model of endogenous trade policy formation that incorporates some of the channels, identied in
previous literature, through which FTA can a¤ect the external tari¤s of a FTA member. This
base model provides a testable prediction on how tari¤ complementarity and tari¤ revenue
a¤act the choice of external tari¤ policy for FTA members through terms-of-trade e¤ects.
1See Syropoulos (2002), Facchini et al. (2013), Kennan and Riezman (1990), Bagwell and Staiger (1997b),
Ornelas (2005) and Freund and Ornelas (2010).
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Similar results are found in Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2004b), Ornelas (2005c), and
Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas (2008). These results show that FTA induces acceleration
on external tari¤ liberalization among its members, and this result is consistent to the ndings
in previous literature about the building blocke¤ect of FTA.
Next, we extend this model by introducing a political factor that allows us to capture
and di¤erentiate the motive for tari¤ cooperation between FTA members. FTA members will
internalize the e¤ect of their external tari¤policy on their partners welfare if they are concerned
about each others. The internalization takes the form of jointly optimization of external tari¤
by incorporating the partners welfare function into each others objective functions. We allow
heterogeneity in the degree of internalization which is weighted by this political factor. We use
political relation between FTA partners as the measure for this political factor. This political
feature of the model shows that FTA members coordinate more on external tari¤ setting when
their political relations are closer. It also implies that when a FTA is formed by close political
partners, their external trade policy tends to be more protectionist as what we would expect
to nd among CU members.
To test for tari¤ cooperation among FTA members, we formulate our empirical specication
based on the predictions of the equilibrium external tari¤ policy from the structural model.
From the theoretical model, we derive two equilibrium policies: (i) equilibrium external tari¤
policy under non-cooperative setup; (ii) equilibrium external tari¤ policy under cooperative
setup. We derive the di¤erence in external tari¤ policy from the equilibrium under these two
setups and specify our empirical strategy to test the di¤erence as the e¤ect of tari¤ cooperation
on external tari¤.
The data we use for this project come from several sources. Data on tari¤ cover 170 di¤erent
countries for the period from 1988 to 2011 at HS 6-digit level. During this time period, a total
of 177 free trade agreements have been established. Industrial data in manufacturing sector
covering these countries during the periods are at ISIC 3-digit level. To approximate political
relations between countries we employ three measures: (i) the a¢ nity scores from the UN
General Assembly Voting Data; (ii) the formal alliance status from the Correlates of War
Formal Alliance data; and (iii) bilateral political events and interactions from the Conict and
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Peace Data Bank.2
We then estimate our empirical specication using the data. Our results provide strong
evidence for tari¤ cooperation among the FTA formed during the period from 1988 to 2011.
On average, the external tari¤s on the rent-generating industries for FTA partners liberalize
20% slower compared to other industries. The results also show that political relation plays an
important role in determining FTA partnersexternal tari¤ policy. Comparing to the results
without the political factor as the benchmark, we nd an addition of 8% slower liberalization
in external tari¤s on the rent-generating industries among the FTA partners who share similar
economic and political interests, and an addition of 20% slower liberalization among those who
have formal alliance with military defense treaty.
Our work is related to the strand of literature on the impact of regionalism on multilateral-
ism. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Stoyanov (2009), RTA weakens the motivation
for tari¤ protection by creating leakage in this protectionist trade policy so that reduces the
incentive for special politically active group lobbying for protection. Levy (1997) shows that
bilateral trade agreement may disproportionally benets the countriesmedian voters, thus
increasing the support against protection liberalization. Krishna (1998) suggests that if RTA
creates large gains to some powerful economic groups, reduction is external protection becomes
politically infeasible.
Our work is also related to the studies on incentives to alter external tari¤s in RTAs. Kennan
and Riezman (1990) show that in a three-country general equilibrium endowment economy, equi-
librium external tari¤s are higher when countries moving from FTA to CU. Richardson (1993)
nds that FTA members tend to lower external tari¤s to mitigate the negative impact from
trade diversion generated by RTA. Bagwell and Staiger (1997b), Freund (2000), Bond, Riez-
man, and Syropoulos (2004b), Ornelas (2005a, 2005b), and Saggi and Yildiz (2010) illustrate
how FTA induces incentive for multilateral trade through terms-of-trade e¤ect.
Our paper is also related to Limao (2007)s study. He looks at tari¤ cooperation of FTA
partners in non-tradeissues. Preferential treatment is o¤ered to RTA partners in exchange for
cooperation on, for example, drug trade issues. A reduction on external tari¤ protection would
diminish the benet the RTA partners from this preferential treatment, so that it could erode
2Detail descriptions of the data can be found in Section 3.4.
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the incentive for the partners to maintain their cooperation on non-trade issues. This paper
is closely related to Mai and Stoyanov (2013)s study, which analyse the e¤ect of CUSFTA on
Canadian external trade policy. In this study, they categorize Canadian industries in quartiles
ranked by the rent generated to US, and they nd that the industries which create the least
rent to US have exhibited fastest liberalization in external tari¤s.
The paper is organized as the follows. In the next section, we present the model of en-
dogenous trade policy formation and derive the equilibrium external tari¤ policy under tari¤
cooperation. In Section 3.3, we present the empirical specication and the interpretations of
the key variables. In Section 3.4, we discuss the data used for this project. In Section 3.5, we
present the empirical results and the discussion of the results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Theory
In this section, we study the channels through which di¤erent degrees of political relation can
a¤ect a countrys choice on its external tari¤s. We present a monopolistic competition model
with di¤erentiated products and free market entry, and derive the equilibrium trade policy for
a country which faces heterogeneous political a¢ nity to her partners with preferential trade
agreements (PTA). The theoretical model will lay foundations for our empirical specications.
To identify tari¤ cooperation within a FTA, our strategy is to incorporate a measurement
for political relations among FTA partners as the weights for the importance of the partners
national welfare that are taken into consideration into governments decision of the formation
of its external trade policy. Then derive and compare the equilibrium trade policy with and
without tari¤ cooperation.
Consider a model with a Home country, H, trading with R partner countries with PTA and
F countries without PTA, hereafter indexed by H, f and r respectively. Note that f = 1; :::; F
and r = 1; :::; R, and country j 2 fH; f; rg. All countries produce and trade N +1 goods, with
the rst good being a numeraire, traded at no costs and produced by perfectly competitive
rms. For all other industry i the number of rms in each country j is xed and equal to nij ,
and each rm produces a distinct variety of a good. All rms in industry i are assumed to
be symmetric within country j, therefore they share the same demand function, production
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technology and charge the same price. There are (niH +
PF
f=1 nif +
PR
r=1 nir) varieties in
industry i available to consumers in country H for H 6= f and H 6= r.
Suppose that the preferences of a representative agent in country j can be denoted by a
quasilinear utility function with a constant elasticity of substitution for varieties in industry i
U = X0 +
nX
i=1
i lnXi;
nX
i=1
ai = 1 (3.1)
where i is the fraction of total expenditure the agent spends on industry i goods. X0 is
consumption of the numeraire good. Xi is the sub-utility derived from the consumption of
di¤erentiated product i produced at home and abroad, and assumed to take the non-symmetric
CES form, which can be represented by
Xi =
0@niHd 1iiHxi 1iiH + RX
r=1
nird
1
i
ir x
i 1
i
ir +
FX
f=1
nifjd
1
i
if x
i 1
i
if
1A
i
i 1
(3.2)
where i > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of good i, dij denotes the taste
parameter for i from country j, and xij is the demand for i produced in country j. Maximizing
equation (3.1) subject to standard budget constraint, we obtain the demand function and
aggregate price index for the di¤erentiated product i:
xij = aidijp
 i
ij P
i 1
i 8 j 2 fH; f; rg (3.3)
Pi =
0@niHdiHp1 iiH + RX
r=1
nirdirp
1 i
ir +
FX
f=1
nifdifp
1 i
if
1A 11 i : (3.4)
Home country government sets two types of ad valorem tari¤s - preferential tari¤,  ir, on
imports from country r and MFN tari¤,  if , on imports from country f . The prot function
facing di¤erent rms in Home country can be written as:
iH = (piH   ciH) qiH (3.5)
ij = ((1   ij)pij   cij) qij 8 j 2 ff; rg
where qij is the quantity supplied and cij is the marginal costs of production. Assuming the
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number of rms is large enough that an individual rms decision on pricing has no impact on
the aggregate price index Pi, each rm takes the price index as given. Knowing the demand
function, each rm maximizes prot by setting its price:
piH =

i
i   1

ciH , pij =
i
(i   1)
1
(1   ij)cij 8 j 2 ff; rg (3.6)
where  ij is the ad valorem tari¤ collected by the Home country government. Each rm sets
its price by a mark-up over its marginal cost. Substituting equation (3.6) into (3.5), the prot
functions can be written in a convenient form:
iH = 
 1
i piHxiH (3.7)
ij = (1   ij) 1i pijqij 8 j 2 ff; rg:
The next step towards deriving the optimal trade policy on external tari¤ is to set up
governments objective function. One issue is that we do not know the form of the objective
function. Participation in any trade agreement is afterall a political decision therefore this
function can take various forms depending on the objectives of governments.3 For now, we
assume that governmentsobjectives are socially desirable for their domestic welfare. Let the
objective function, G, consist of the sum of consumer surplus from consumption of di¤erentiated
goods (CS), tari¤ revenue (TR), and prots of domestic rms (iH):
G = CS( ij) + TR( ij) +
nX
i=1
niHiH( ij) (3.8)
where
CS( ij) = U(X0; Xi;  ij) 
nX
i=1
H;F;RX
j=1
pijnijxij ; (3.9)
and
TR() =
nX
i=1
F;RX
j=1
 ijnijxij : (3.10)
3Grossman and Helpman (1994), (1995), Krishna (1998), and Stoyanov (2009) show that special interest
groups inuence governmentsobjectives. Limao (2007) shows that RTAs can be used by governments as motives
to induce partner country to cooperate in non-trade areas.
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3.2.1 Tari¤ cooperation in FTA
One distinction between members of FTA and CU is that FTA members maintain autonomous
external tari¤ policies while CU members jointly set and share common external tari¤s. This
subtle di¤erence creates the tendency for members of CUs to coordinate and adopt higher ex-
ternal tari¤s than those of FTAs.4 Tari¤ coordinations among CUs have been criticized because
they could hinder the viability of multilateral free trade. However, it is not yet clear whether
tari¤ coordination exists among FTAs because government can adjust external tari¤ rates to
accommodate the impact from the changes in preferential policy and reassure its objectives.5
Next, we look at the case when a government of FTA members is concerned about the
welfare of other members of the FTA, it incorporates the welfare of other members into its
objective function (3.8), it becomes:
G = CS( if ) + TR( if ) +
nX
i=1
niHiH( if ) +
RX
rj=1
rWr; (3.11)
where Wr is the welfare of partner country r and r 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of concern
country H to Wr.6 Since the external policy of H will a¤ect the prots of exporting rms of
r in H and not a¤ect the consumer surplus and tari¤ revenue of partner r, we can simplify
expression (3.11) as the following:
G = CS( if ) + TR( if ) +
nX
i=1
niHiH( if ) +
nX
i=1
RX
r=1
rnirir( if ); (3.12)
where nirir is the total prots of rms from partner r in industry i in H. Government of H
internalizes the prots of rms from partner r (essentially partners welfare) into consideration
when optimizing its objective function, and the larger is r the higher degree of internalization
takes place for its partner rs welfare in Hs objective function. By choosing the level of
4See Kennan and Riezman (1990) and Facchini et al. (2013) among others for rationales for higher external
tari¤s under CUs. Estevadeordal et al. (2008) nd tari¤ complementarity only in FTAs.
5See for example of optimal external tari¤s settings Kennan and Riezman (1990), Richardson (1993), Yi
(1996), Bagwell and Staiger (1999), Cadot et al. (1999), Freund (2000) and more recently Ornelas (2005a,
2005b), (2007), Facchini et al. (2009).
6A common method used in literature to model tari¤ cooperation among CU members which choose a common
tari¤ to maximize joint welfare. See Bagwell and Staiger (1997a) and Ornelas (2007b) for example.
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external tari¤ rate  if , H maximizes its object in (3.12), and after collecting terms, we obtain
the following equilibrium external tari¤ policy:
fi  if =
i   1
i
siH + (i   1)
RX
r=1
 irsir +
i   1
i
RX
r=1
r (1   ir) sir (3.13)
where siH =
nirpirxir
ai
is the market share of domestic rms in industry i and sir =
nirpirxir
ai
is market share of rms in industry i from partner country r in H. On the left hand side
of equation (3.13) is external tari¤ rate  if multiplied by 
f
i , which is the import demand
elasticity for goods i imported from outsiders. In (3.13), siH and sir are positively related to
external tari¤  if . The positive relation between siH and  if suggests that if the market share
of domestic rms in industry i is low after the formation of FTA, it is optimal to have a low
external tari¤ rate for i. One explanation for this positive relation is the protection leakage
e¤ect. If siH is small in H, protection from high  if will be an ine¢ cient rent-generator for
domestic rms, instead, part of the rents would go to the partnersrms. Because protection
for rents to domestic rms becomes less e¤ective when siH is small, H would be better o¤ to
shift some of the rents from FTA partners back to CS by lowering  if .
The second term in (3.13) reects the e¤ect of tari¤ complementarity such as in Richardson
(1993). If preferential tari¤s are low - large preferential margins, it is optimal for government
to lower the corresponding external tari¤s. The complementary e¤ect is stronger with larger
market share of partner rms and closer substitute of product i. Intuitively, a drop in intra-bloc
tari¤ induces a shift of imports from outsiders, who have comparative advantage in production
of i, to less e¢ cient partner r thanks to preferential tari¤ treatment. Thus, the trade diversion
reduces overall welfare. To mitigate the welfare lost from the distortion of trade pattern,
governments can lower external tari¤s to redirect some of the imports back to their original
sources.7
The last term in (3.13) indicates the e¤ect from tari¤ cooperation. The positive relation
between  if and sir suggests that, if H is concerned about partner rs welfare, it is optimal to
coordinate with high external tari¤ for industry i if the market shares of rms from partner r
7Other researchers also provide di¤erent explanations for tari¤ complementarity, for example Bagwell and
Staiger (1999) in terms of trade motivations; Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Ornelas (2005a) in political
economy factors; Saggi and Yildiz (2010) in endowment models with endogenous trade agreements.
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in industry i is large after the formation of FTA. The intensity for tari¤ cooperation is strong
if r is high. Reducing the external tari¤ in i would induce competition coming from external
rms and thus reduce the rents of the partners rms.
For the case when r = 0, it implies no tari¤ cooperation between FTA members. The
welfare function of FTA partner Wr in (3.11) does not enter the objective function of H gov-
ernment. In such case, the external tari¤ policy in equilibrium becomes
iROW  iROW =
i   1
i
siH + (i   1)
RX
r=1
 irsir: (3.14)
3.3 Empirical specication
Policy response often may not be instantaneous. To allow for policy response delays, we intro-
duce time dimension to both (3.13) and (3.14). Next, we move to estimate tari¤ cooperation
among FTA partners. First, suppose H and r form a trade agreement at time t. If H coordi-
nates its external tari¤ for r into period t+ 1, from (3.13), we have
fi  if;t+1 =
i   1
i
siH;t+1 + (i   1)
RX
r=1
 ir;t+1sir;t+1 +
i   1
i
RX
r=1
r (1   ir;t+1) sir;t+1: (3.15)
Comparing (3.15) to the equilibrium external tari¤ policy represent by (3.14) in period t, and
time di¤erencing gives us the following:
fi1
f
i;t =
i   1
i
1siH;t + (i   1)
RX
r=1
1 ir;tsir;t +
i   1
i
RX
r=1
r (1   ir;t) sir;t (3.16)
where 1 represent time di¤erence by 1 period. Note that the last term on the right hand
side of (3.16) is the market share from r in level, for which, one interpretation can be that it
captures the importance of industry i to partner r.
Equation (3.16) outlines the two forces driving external tari¤s in opposite directions - tari¤
complementarity and tari¤ coordination. With our main goal focused on testing tari¤ coordi-
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nation among FTAs, and motivated by (3.16), our empirical framework is the following:
i
i   1
f
i1
f
i;t = 0 + 11siH;t + 2
RX
r=1
1 ir;tsir;t + 3
RX
r=1
r;t (1   ir;t) sir;t + i;t (3.17)
where sir;t is measured by the value of imports of good i from partner r over the total domestic
spending on i at time t and siH;t is the domestic output over the total domestic spending
on i at t. Equation (3.17) assembles the relationship between external tari¤ and the key
explanatory variables from the model into an econometric form. Note that for the FTAs where
 ir;t immediately reduce to zero, for following years  ir;t become zero. In such case, the
term
PR
rj=1
 irj ;tsirj ;t disappears and
PR
rj=1
rj;t
 
1   irj ;t

sirj ;t becomes
PR
rj=1
rj;tsirj ;t.
In previous literature, the role of political a¢ nity is often overlooked when investigating the
relationships between preferential tari¤ and MFN tari¤ for industries traded with FTA partners
and outsiders.8 The e¤ects of preferential tari¤ from di¤erent FTA partners on MFN tari¤ are
treated homogeneously. However, relations of countries are heterogeneous and thus there is a
strong reason to believe the e¤ect of tari¤ cooperation on external tari¤ must be di¤erent by
country if political relationship between partner countries matters when a country sets up its
external policies. One novelty of this study is that we estimate the e¤ect of preferential tari¤
on external tari¤s under a political economic perspective by di¤erentiating the importance of
FTA partnerswelfare to government H so that the impact on its external policy is weighted
di¤erently by how close the political relations are its partners. In equation (3.17), r is a
partner country specic political parameter that weights the importance of the market shares
from r in H. The idea is that, if partner country r is politically close to H, r is high and share
of partner rms sir;t matters more in the relation to 
f
i;t ceteris paribus, we would expect a
more signicant of 3 in the estimation of (3.17).
To test whether or not political relation r matters for tari¤ cooperation, we estimate two
sets of results on (3.17) - one treating all r homogeneously (e.g. r = 1 for all r), and another
allowing r to vary. Consider four scenarios - a pair FTA partners can have high or low r pre-
or post- FTA formation. Figure 3:1 illustrates the level of MFN tari¤ of H for non-members
8For example, Limaos (2006) approach is to assign a dummy variable that equals one for industries US
imports from its PTA partner and compare the change in MFN tari¤s in these industries to those that do not
import from PTA partners post- and pre- Uruguay Round.
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before and after the formation of FTA. External tari¤,  fi;t, on country f is at 
f
i;t0
(Lrj;t0
; Hrj;t0
)
from time t0. Suppose H and r forms a FTA at time t1, the external tari¤ on f can either go up
or down or remain unchanged.9 The average MFN tari¤ rate is 9:6% for the period from 1988
to 2011, and have decreased by 0:35% per year. Figure 3:1 shows this general downward trend
of global MFN tari¤s. The idea is that if Home and country rj are close political partners,
Home is concerned about rjs welfare and adopts a more protective external policy after the
formation of FTA. In such case,  f is higher than it would otherwise be in post PTA period
t1. For the country pair, political a¢ nity set (Hrj;t0 ; 
H
rj;t1
) and (Lrj;t0 ; 
H
rj;t1), 
f
i;t+1 will be
at 
fHigh
i;t1
. External tari¤ is lower at  fLowi;t1 for (
H
rj;t0
; Lrj;t1) and (
L
rj;t0
; Lrj;t1). The di¤erence
between 
fHigh
i;t1
and  fLowi;t1 is the stumbling e¤ect on external liberalization coming from tari¤
cooperation based on their level of political a¢ nity rj;t . More importantly, a statistically
signicant rj;t would provide a possible answer to the puzzle why some nd stumbling block
e¤ect in FTAs while others nd building block e¤ect.
If tari¤ cooperation exists, we would be more likely to nd it in industries that import
under PTA. We expect there is no tari¤ cooperation for industries that have no imports from
PTA partners because the higher external tari¤ rate does not increase the prots of partner
countriesrms, and it is not in the interest of the Home government too. We expect the e¤ect
of cooperation will be stronger if the size of market share of partnersrms in i is large.10 The
the e¤ect of PTA on external tari¤would probably be undermined because the dummy variable
forgoes the size e¤ect.
The key variable of interest is
PR
r=1 r;t (1   ir;t) sir;t because we are interested to know
how  fi;t responds in industries that are benecial to r. For capturing the potential further delays
in policy responds, we include 6 more lag periods of
PR
r=1 r;t (1   ir;t) sir;t in (3.17). Changes
in preferential policy will force partnersrms to adjust their production and management,
and the process likely take time. Any changes in Homes market conditions coming from the
impact of partnersrmsadjustments are more likely to emerge in later periods. We expect
9WTO member conutries have legally bound commitments on tari¤ rates, which act as the ceilings on tari¤s.
Governments can adjust tari¤ rates upward only if the applied rates are lower than the bound rates.
10Using import share of PTA partner rms in Home may not be the best way to measure the importance of
industry i to partner country as some suggest the importance of industry i in Home for PTA partner country
should be measured by the export share of i in partner country to Home. However, we argue this is a reasonable
measure for capturing tari¤ cooperation because if Home is concerned about welfare of partner country, it cares
the most for large industries in the Home market.
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governments response through external policy to any market condition changes will not happen
simultaneously so we lag all explanatory variables to one period time. After implementing the
lag periods, the estimation equation becomes
Yi;t = 0 + 1X
1
i;t 1 + 2X
2
i;t 1 + 3X
3
i;t 1 + 4X
3
i;t 2 + :::+ 8X
3
i;t 6 + i;t (3.18)
where Yi;t = ii 1
f
i1
f
i;t, X
1
i;t 1 = 1siH;t = siH;t   siH;t 1, X2i;t 1 =
PR
r=1  ir;tsir;t  PR
r=1  ir;t 1sir;t 1,X
3
i;t 1 =
PR
r=1 r;t 1 (1   ir;t 1) sir;t 1 andX3i;t 2 =
PR
r=1 r;t 2 (1   ir;t 2) sir;t 2.
Also note that time di¤erence in equation (3.18) can also help remove any country-industry xed
e¤ects.
3.3.1 Estimation issues
Endogeneity is a serious concern when estimating the e¤ect of market share on external tari¤
policy because the level of external tari¤ can reversely a¤ect the market shares of both domes-
tic and foreign rms. Since we are interested in establishing the causal relationship, a good
instrument for the market shares of PTA partners in Home becomes very important. To do this
we construct an instrument variable for traded goods from PTA partners following the method-
ology detailed in Frankel and Romer (1999). We predict trade ows between countries using
geographic characteristics from gravity equation. This is a valid approach because trade ows
between countries are highly correlated to their geographical characteristics, which are unlikely
correlated to any trade policies. We regress the values of imports in log for every industry i on
dyadic gravity variables. We perform the following:
ln(Mij) = a0 + a1 lnDij + a2 lnNi + a3 lnNj + a4 lnAi + a5 lnAj (3.19)
+a6 (Li + Lj) + a7B + a8B lnDij + a9B lnAi + a10B lnAj
+a11B lnNi + a12B lnNj + a14B (Li + Lj) :
In equation (3.19), Dij is the distance between country i and j, Ni and Ai are the population
and area in country i respectively, and Li indicates whether country i is landlocked. The
tted values of equation (3.19) are used as our instrument variable (IV ) for imports of Home
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i from partner rj , denoted by import_iv1 in Table 3.1 We construct three additional IV to
ensure results will be not sensitive to the way we construct the IV . For the second IV , we
extend equation (3.19) to include controlling for high dimensional country-year xed e¤ects for
country i and j following the estimation procedure in Martyn et al. (2006). The tted values
are denoted by import_iv2 in Table 3.1 The third IV and the fourth IV , include controls for
industry-year xed e¤ects and country-industry-year xed e¤ects respectively and are denoted
by import_iv3 and import_iv4.
3.4 Data
This paper uses data from several di¤erent sources. Tari¤ data comes from UN Comtrade
Database, covering 183 free trade agreements involved 170 di¤erent countries for the time period
from 1988 to 2011, available at the 6-digit HS classication level. Tari¤ rates are aggregated
to ISIC 3-digit level based on Product Concordance from World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS). The data on output, imports, exports and import demand elasticities fi are obtained
from Nicita, and Olarreaga (2006). Domestic share, siH;t, is constructed by the value of domestic
output in industry i over the total domestic spending on i. Similarly, the share of PTA partner,
sirj ;t, is the ratio of the value of imports from partner rj to domestic spending in i. The missing
values in output data is imputed with the tted value from regressing output data to industry
index. The data on elasticity of substitution, i, is obtained from Broda and Weinstein (2006)
at ISIC 3-digit level. The data on geographical characteristics is from Mayer and Zignago
(2011). Gravity equation variables come from Head and Mayer (2013).
We employ several approaches to measure bilateral political relation rj;t . For our rst
measure, we use the a¢ nity score index constructed by Voeten (2013) based on the United
Nations General Assembly Voting Data (UNGAVD). The data records voting information on
General Assembly resolutions for each UN member country. UN members can approve, ab-
stain, or disapprove of each resolution. Based on the voting data, the dyadic a¢ nity scores
is constructed as the share of similar votes between country i and country j over the total of
country is votes. The a¢ nity score index is often used to measure the degree of similarity in
the economic and geopolitical interests of a pair of countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). For
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example, the average magnitude of the a¢ nity score index for US and its major political allies
(Canada, France, Israel, UK, and Australia) ranges from 0:58 to 0:86 for the period between
2000 and 2012, and the score ranges from 0:17 to 0:21 for countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan,
Cuba, Indonesia, and China during these periods.
Common political interests between countries is an important indicator of good international
relations, yet not a perfect one. As Voeten (2013) points out, some countries may have share
similar voting patterns in the UN on global matters but have poor political relations (e.g.
India and Pakistan). Therefore, it is necessary to have additional political relation proxies to
complement UN a¢ nity scores.
Our second measure of political relations is the formal alliance status between two countries.
We retrieve alliances data from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance (COWFA) v4.1 data set
rst constructed by Small and Singer (1969) and maintained by Gibler and Press (2009). This
data set covers the periods from 1835 to 2012. The COWFA divides country is alliances into
3 categories - defense pact, neutrality (non-aggression) treaty, and entente agreement. We use
an indicator variable to classify countries are in good political relation if there is defense pact,
which is the highest level of military commitment among these three classes and it requires
intense political cooperation.
For the third measure of political relations, we use the frequencies of bilateral events and
interactions from the Conict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), which records actions of
approximately 135 countries toward one another on a daily basis. The majority of the interna-
tional events that involve countries are related to political relations (37:6%), economic relations
(27:5%), military and strategic relations (14:9%), and cultural and scientic relations (10%).
The bilateral interactions are categorized as cooperative, neutral or uncooperative. The events
are recorded for the period from 1948 to 1978, a bit over 20 years prior to the rst year of
our data set, and the relevance of these events for the current political relations is certainly a
concern. However, we argue that the international relations between countries have remained
relatively stable since the end of the Second World War and the frequency of diplomatic inter-
actions from 1950s to 1970s can still be informative of the current international relations.11
11This may not be the case for relationship with countries from the former Soviet Block, so we excluded them
from this analysis.
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In order to isolate the role of political relations from other inuences to the frequency
of bilateral events, such as the relative size of two countries, we rst regress the number of
diplomatic cooperative interactions on the log of population, GDP, geographic area, and the
log of distance from one another using the full sample of country-pairs.12 Because the dependent
variable is a count variable with a large dispersion, the model is estimated by negative binomial
regression with country-year xed e¤ects. We use the residuals from the regression as our
measure of political relations, which is essentially the frequency of bilateral events purged from
the scale e¤ect. Figure 3:2 plots political interactions index against the a¢ nity scores for US
and other countries in our sample. It reveals that the frequency of diplomatic interactions
is positively correlated with a¢ nity scores, suggesting that the two measures capture similar
aspects of political relations.
Table 3:1 summarizes the variables of interests in this study. The average MFN tari¤ in
our sample is 7.3% during the period from 1988 to 2011. The average reduction of MFN tari¤
is about 0.4% each year during this period. The shares of domestic output over domestic
consumptions are just over 60% and shrinks at about 1% per year on average for countries
in our sample. The political relation proxies from UN a¢ nity scores, defense pack, political
interactions are summarized in UN , Defense, and Interaction respectively.
3.5 Results
In this section, we will provide results from estimating specication (3.18) and discuss their
economic implications.
First, we want to learn whether in general countries are concerned with the welfare of their
PTA partners. One way is to test if countries o¤er protectionist trade policy to umbrella the
industries that are important to their PTA partners. We begin with estimating specication
(3.18) without including any political relation proxy. This estimation shows how external tari¤
of each country H responds in the industries which have presence from their PTA partners
rms. If there is tari¤ coordination between PTA members, we would expect external tari¤s to
be relatively higher in these industries or they are liberalized slower than they would otherwise
12These variables are retrieved from Research and Expertise on the World Economy (CEPII).
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be. Linear regression results are provided in Table 3:2. Column (1) reports the result on how
changes in external tari¤ respond in industries with market presence of partnersrms for lagged
6 periods. Results in column (2) and column (3) are adjusted by elasticity of substitution and
import demand elasticity respectively. Results in column (4) are adjusted by both types of
elasticity. All these results are controlled for country-industry xed e¤ects. Results in Table 2
show that there are positive associations between changes in external tari¤s and market presence
of PTA partner countriesrms. The e¤ects are stronger in the 2nd and the 3rd lagged periods
with coe¢ cients statistically signicant at 0:01. The results suggest that an increase in market
share of PTA partnersrms by one standard deviation is associated with about 3 percentage
points increase in external tari¤ in industry i for the 3rd period after formation of PTA.
We report the panel structure regression results from estimating specication (3.18) with
di¤erent political relation proxies in Table 3:3. Column (1) provides the results unweighted
by any political relation measures as the benchmark. For estimation results in Column (2) to
(4), the market share from PTA partnersrms are weighted by political relation proxies. For
example, when sirj ;t is weighted by defense treaty Defense;r (in Column 3), it estimates the
e¤ect of those industries imports from country Hs political alliances. The estimation results
relaxing the elasticity are reported in column (5) - (8). If close political relation between
countries induces higher cooperation on external trade policy, we would expect the e¤ect of
weighted sirj ;t on changes in external tari¤ to be stronger. Comparing to the benchmark results
in Column (1), we nd results weighted by political relation proxies are stronger especially
for the 2nd and 3rd periods into PTA. For example, results in Column (2) suggests that those
industries with rms from PTA partner countries which share similar geopolitical and economic
interests enjoy about 50% more tari¤ protection at 3rd year into PTA. We nd similar e¤ects
when sirj ;t is weighted by Defense;r and Interaction;r.
Next, we report the IV estimation results for Imports from PTA partners. First, we estimate
the benchmark model using unweighted sirj ;t and which is instrumented by four di¤erent IV s
which discussed in the previous section. Results are reported in Table 3:4 Column (1) - (4).
Column (5) - (8) report the estimation results excluding the elasticity. In Table 3:5, we show the
IV estimation results for specication (3.18) using three political relation proxies. The results
from IV estimators are robust and consistent to the previous ndings.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an endogenous trade policy formation model in a monopolistic compe-
tition framework with di¤erentiated products and free market entry. We derive the equilibrium
trade policy that incorporates a political factor to captures tari¤ cooperation between FTA
member countries. Using this model, we show that multilateral liberalization is slower if FTA
partners are concerned about the welfare of other members when setting their external trade
policy.
We test this the prediction of the model using comprehensive trade and industry data, and
nd evidence that supports the tari¤ cooperative hypothesis. In addition, we nd that the closer
are the two FTA partners in political relations the more likely these two members coordinate
their external trade policy to benet the national welfare of the other.
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3.7 Tables and figures 
 
 
Mean
Standard 
deviation
Min Max N
MFN tariff .073 .161 0 25.662 84429
Δ t-1 MFN tariff -.004 .183 -2.586 13.834 77430
Preferential tariff .001 .011 0 1.958 84429
Δ t-1 Preferential tariff 0 .015 -1.958 1.901 77430
Import demand elasticity 7.2 40.471 1.042 2944.918 63015
Elasticity of substitution -1.093 1.066 -38.681 -.003 50835
Share iH,t .633 .297 0 1 12068
Δ t-1 Share iH -.007 .093 -.971 .895 10469
Share ir,t .002 .028 0 .973 15458
Δ t-1 Share ir,t 0 .039 -.954 .973 13043
ln(import) 5.651 3.187 0 18.956 2374356
ln(import_IV 1 ) 5.172 1.748 .002 16.705 1525623
ln(import_IV 2 ) 5.403 2.715 0 22.337 2173609
ln(import_IV 3 ) 5.405 2.714 0 22.345 2173609
ln(import_IV 4 ) 5.43 2.675 0 20.023 1525623
ф UN .834 .151 0 1 387840
ф Defense .793 .405 0 1 60349
ф Interaction -.2 .533 -1 6.06 11151
Note: MFN tariff and Preferential tariff are aggregated from 6-digit HS classification to 3-digit
ISIC classification. Share iH,t is the ratio of domestic output to domestic consumption of i at 
time t . Share ir,t is the ratio of import from partner r to domestic consumption of i at time t . 
Imports are recorded at 6-digit HS classification. The correlations between imports and its
instrument variables import_IV 1 - import_IV 4 are 0.505, 0.829, 0.83, and 0.832 respectively.
ф UN is UN affinity score. ф Defense =1 when two countries is with defense treaty. ф Interaction is
the measure of political interactions between countries purged from scale effects. 
Table 3.1 
Summary statistics of variables of interest.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔShare iH,t 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.250) (0.212) (0.328) (0.335) (0.416) (0.567)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-1 ) Share ir,t-1 0.096* 0.049* 0.273 0.138 0.048 0.070
(0.097) (0.091) (0.143) (0.142) (0.185) (0.164)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-2 )Share ir,t-2 0.385*** 0.201*** 0.527** 0.263** 0.198*** 0.338***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.021) (0.003) (0.000)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-3 )Share ir,t-3 0.298*** 0.154*** 0.631*** 0.322*** 0.104*** 0.230***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-4 )Share ir,t-4 0.042** 0.021** 0.114* 0.056* 0.004 0.020*
(0.036) (0.035) (0.055) (0.053) (0.296) (0.095)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-5 )Share ir,t-5 0.067** 0.034** 0.187** 0.093** 0.003 0.028*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.049) (0.048) (0.122) (0.088)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-6 )Share ir,t-6 0.063* 0.032* 0.179* 0.089* 0.010* 0.021
(0.066) (0.065) (0.085) (0.083) (0.067) (0.198)
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.054 0.031 0.116 0.234 0.063 0.095
No. of Obs. 13031 12465 10626 10085 13031 13031
F statistics 17.13 16.75 6.91 8.36 3.31 3.31
The dependent variable is Δτ ij,t in column (1), (5), (6,), and [ σ ij /(σ ij -1)]Δτ ij,t in column (2), and ε ij Δτ ij,t in column (3), and ε ij [σ ij /(σ ij -
1)]Δτ ij,t in column (4). ΔShare iH,t is 1-period time difference in the ratio of domestic output to domestic consumption of i . Share ir,t is the
ratio of import from partner r to domestic consumption of i at time t . Column (1) - (4) include country-industry fixed effect. Column (5)
includes industry-year fixed effects. Columne (6) includes country-industry and year fixed effects. p-values, based on standard errors
clustered at country-industry level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.2
Linear regression results of the effects of political relation on external tariffs.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ф r =1 ф UN,r ф Defense,r ф Interaction,r ф r =1 ф UN,r ф Defense,r ф Interaction,r
ΔShare iH,t 0 0 0 0 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.300) (0.303) (0.317) (0.302) (0.537) (0.541) (0.549) (0.538)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-1 ) Share ir,t-1 0.137 0.520 0.093*** 0.122 0.070 0.297 0.025 0.060
(0.112) (0.140) (0.000) (0.114) (0.134) (0.114) (0.100) (0.139)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-2 )Share ir,t-2 0.289** 0.274** 0.736*** 0.436** 0.338*** 0.478*** 0.890*** 0.427***
(0.011) (0.028) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-3 )Share ir,t-3 0.331*** 0.487*** 0.441*** 0.420*** 0.230*** 0.345*** 0.221*** 0.268***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-4 )Share ir,t-4 0.056** 0.076** 0.095*** 0.051* 0.020* 0.058 0.007 0.016
(0.037) (0.046) (0.000) (0.067) (0.072) (0.102) (0.464) (0.110)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-5 )Share ir,t-5 0.093** 0.138** 0.157*** 0.084* 0.028* 0.068* 0.009 0.022
(0.033) (0.043) (0.000) (0.061) (0.066) (0.060) (0.528) (0.117)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-6 )Share ir,t-6 0.088* 0.083 0.172*** 0.080 0.021 0.023 0.007 0.016
(0.062) (0.134) (0.000) (0.107) (0.166) (0.250) (0.676) (0.259)
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistics 9.73 6.25 17.73 11.42 30.26 26.53 33.61 29.53
Rho .49 .49 .49 .49 .14 .14 .13 .14
R 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.051 0.047 0.049
No. of Obs. 10085 10085 10085 10085 13031 13031 13031 13031
The dependent is ε ij [σ ij /(σ ij -1)]Δτ ij,t in column (1) - (4) and Δτ ij,t in column (5) - (8). Column (1) and (5) report estimates not weighted by proxy of political
relation. Share iH,t is 1-period time difference in the ratio of domestic output to domestic consumption of i. Share ir,t-1 is the ratio of import from partner r to
domestic consumption of i at time t-1 . ф r is the political relation proxy. Estimates in column (2) and (6) are weighted by political affinity scores from UN
Assembly Votings. Estimates in column (3) and (7) are weighted by defense treaty dummy. Estimates in column (4) and (8) are weighted by dyad political
interactions. p-values, based on standard errors clustered at country-industry level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.3
Estimation results for the effects of political relation on external tariffs in panel structure.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Iv 1 Iv 2 Iv 3 Iv 4 Iv 1 Iv 2 Iv 3 Iv 4
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-1 ) Share ir,t-1 1.583*** 0.769** 0.645** 0.602** 1.034*** 0.465*** 0.410** 0.397**
(0.000) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.000) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-2 )Share ir,t-2 0.534*** 0.288*** 0.258*** 0.237*** 0.479*** 0.474*** 0.462*** 0.457***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-3 )Share ir,t-3 0.520*** 0.429*** 0.382*** 0.372*** 0.413*** 0.359*** 0.331*** 0.326***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-4 )Share ir,t-4 0.975*** 0.381*** 0.302*** 0.281*** 0.669*** 0.271*** 0.224*** 0.213***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-5 )Share ir,t-5 1.218*** 0.485*** 0.396*** 0.393*** 0.162** 0.287*** 0.236*** 0.231***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r (1-τ ir,t-6 )Share ir,t-6 0.981*** 0.311*** 0.248*** 0.252*** 0.865*** 0.202*** 0.168*** 0.168***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ΔShare iH,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.333) (0.286) (0.289) (0.289) (0.276) (0.218) (0.217) (0.217)
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LM statistic 7.50 9.94 4.33 8.12 15.50 8.07 4.46 6.54
Cragg-donald wald 0.62 64.96 111.49 132.47 9.36 87.59 153.67 194.22
Hansen J. statistics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F-statistics 8.70 9.83 10.2 10.55 16.66 21.67 22.17 20.55
No. of Obs. 9882 9875 9920 9936 12779 12775 12824 12844
The dependent is ε ij [σ ij /(σ ij -1)]Δτ ij,t in column (1) - (4) and Δτ ij,t in column (5) - (8). ΔShare iH,t is 1-period time difference in the ratio of domestic output to
domestic consumption of i . Share ir,t-1 is the ratio of import from partner r to domestic consumption of i at time t-1 . Column (1) and (4) are instrumented with Iv1 .
Column (2) and (6) are instrumented with Iv2. Column (3) and (7) are instrumented with Iv3. Column (4) and (8) are instrumented with Iv4. p-values, based on standard
errors clustered at country-industry level, are reported in parentheses. LM statistic reports for underidentification test. Wald F. statistic reports for weak
identification test. Hansen J statistic is zero for the case of exact identification. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.4
Estimation results for the effects of on external tariffs using instrument variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-1 ) Share ir,t-1 2.719*** 2.140*** 1.868*** 1.599*** 0.963*** 0.293*** 0.203*** 0.191*** 2.319*** 0.779** 0.631** 0.579**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.000) (0.033) (0.046) (0.045)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-2 )Share ir,t-2 0.486*** 0.348*** 0.320*** 0.308*** 1.100*** 1.104*** 1.092*** 1.121*** 1.105*** 0.438*** 0.401*** 0.357***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-3 )Share ir,t-3 0.752*** 0.531*** 0.485*** 0.483*** 2.797** 0.587*** 0.497*** 0.505*** 0.936*** 0.524*** 0.465*** 0.468***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-4 )Share ir,t-4 1.039*** 0.723*** 0.618*** 0.531*** 0.990*** 0.362*** 0.237*** 0.222*** 1.134*** 0.398*** 0.308*** 0.287***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-5 )Share ir,t-5 1.391*** 0.868*** 0.751*** 0.726*** 1.292*** 0.443*** 0.291*** 0.292*** 1.477*** 0.500*** 0.399*** 0.392***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Σ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-6 )Share ir,t-6 1.014*** 0.283*** 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.624*** 0.385*** 0.237*** 0.259*** 1.241*** 0.343*** 0.263*** 0.269***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ΔShare iH,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.337) (0.291) (0.293) (0.293) (0.298) (0.318) (0.317) (0.318) (0.346) (0.285) (0.288) (0.288)
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LM statistic 20.65 13.28 2.46 12.9 3.81 2.63 2.63 2.68 6.58 7.52 3.25 5.91
Cragg-Donald Wald 1.86 19.51 2.36 29.84 0.56 54.3 1.72 31.9 0.91 25.03 1.81 26.44
No. of Obs. 9882 9875 9920 9936 9882 9875 9920 9936 9882 9875 9920 9936
ф UN,r ф Defense,r ф Interaction,r
The dependent variable is ε ij [σ ij /(σ ij -1)]Δτ ij,t . ΔShare iH,t is 1-period time difference in the ratio of domestic output to domestic consumption of i . Share ir,t-1 is the ratio of import from
partner r to domestic consumption of i at time t-1 . Estimates in column (1) - (4) are weighted by political affinity scores from UN Assembly Votings. Estimates in column (5) - (8) are
weighted by defense treaty dummy. Estimates in column (9) - (12) are weighted by dyad political interactions. p-values, based on standard errors clustered at country-industry level, are
reported in parentheses. LM statistic reports for underidentification test. Wald F. statistic reports for weak identification test. Hansen J statistic is zero for the case of exact identification. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.5
Estimation results for the effects of political relation on external tariffs using instrument variables.
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Figure 3.1
Change in MFN tariff after formation of PTA for high and low political relation.
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Figure 3.2
UN voting similarity scores against frequency of diplomatic interactions
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendix
Partial equilibrium model with one industry producing homogeneous product traded at price
p.
Assume that preferences of a representative consumer are characterized by a quadratic
utility function:
U = Q  
2
Q2
where Q =
P
i qi is the total consumption of the homogeneous good and qi is quantity purchased
from rm i. Maximizing utility function subject to the standard budget constraint we obtain
inverse demand function
p =   Q
Suppose there are (N + 2) rms in the market. Firm 1 (F1) is a home country rm which
will attempt to imitate production technology of a foreign rm, rm 2 (F2) is the foreign
rm exporting to the home country market utilizing a potentially more advanced production
technology, and the remaining N rms are symmetric in terms of costs and represent the rest
of the industry. We assume they are all domestic rms although this assumption is not critical.
A representative rm from the rest of the industry we call rm 3 (F3). We further assume that
each rm i has a constant marginal costs ci. Prot function of rm i is then given by
i = (p  ci) qi
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If all equilibrium quantities are positive, then the rst-order conditions for prot maximization
give the following best response functions
q1 =
 c1
2   q2+Nq32
q2 =
 c2
2   q1+Nq32
q3 =
 c3
(N+1)   q1+q2(N+1)
Solving this system of equations we obtain equilibrium output of each rm:
q1 =
 (N+2)c1+c2+Nc3
(N+3)
q2 =
+c1 (N+2)c2+Nc3
(N+3)
q3 =
+c1+c2 3c3
(N+3)
Total output, price and consumer surplus:
Q = (N+2) c1 c2 Nc3(N+3)
p = +c1+c2+Nc3(N+3)
CS = 2Q
2
Suppose foreign rm possesses a more advanced production technology characterized by
lower marginal costs. We want to compare two cases: when domestic legal system protects IPR
of the foreign rm and does not allow F1 to imitate its technology; when the legal system favors
domestic rm and allows it to imitate technology of F2. We want to analyze the relationship
between size of F1 and F2 and the change in welfare from technology transfer. Since in our
model a rms relative size depends on relative marginal costs, we want to know how welfare
change varies with c1 and c2.
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Some partial derivatives:
@Q
@c1
=
@Q
@c2
=   1
 (N + 3)
@p
@c1
=
@p
@c2
=
1
(N + 3)
@CS
@c1
=
@CS
@c2
=   Q
(N + 3)
@q1
@c1
=
@q2
@c2
=   N + 2
 (N + 3)
@q1
@c2
=
@q2
@c1
=
@q3
@c2
=
@q3
@c1
=
1
 (N + 3)
@1
@c1
=
q1
(N + 3)
  q1   (p  c1) (N + 2)
 (N + 3)
@1
@c2
=
q1
(N + 3)
+ (p  c1) 1
 (N + 3)
@3
@c1
=
@3
@c2
=
q3
(N + 3)
  (p  c3) 1
 (N + 3)
Welfare:
W = CS + 1 +N3
@W
@c2
=   Q
(N + 3)
+
q1
(N + 3)
+ (p  c1) 1
 (N + 3)
+
q3
(N + 3)
  (p  c3) 1
 (N + 3)
=   q2
(N + 3)
+
N + 1
 (N + 3)
p  1
 (N + 3)
c1   1
 (N + 3)
c3
Consider the case when F2 has access to production technology which reduces marginal
costs by " > 0. Denote by x the change in variable x when we move from the equilibrium in
which F1 is not allowed to imitate this technology to the one where it is allowed. Then
@W
@c2
=   q2
(N + 3)
+
N + 1
 (N + 3)
p  1
 (N + 3)
c1
shows the extent to which the size of the foreign rm a¤ects the benet of not protecting its
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IPR. Using the following conditions:
q2 =   "
 (N + 3)
q1 =
(N + 2) "
 (N + 3)
p =   "
(N + 3)
c1 =  "
we obtain the result:
@W
@c2
=   (2N + 3) "
 (N + 3)2
< 0
This result implies that for small c2 (when foreign rm is large and e¢ cient) allowing F1 to
imitate IPR of F2 will have a stronger positive impact on home country welfare.
Similarly,
@W
@c1
=  q1   q2
(N + 3)
  2
 (N + 3)
p+
(N + 2)
 (N + 3)
c1
=   2 (N + 2)
 (N + 3)
"+
3
 (N + 3)2
" < 0
Therefore, when domestic rm is originally larger and more e¢ cient (c1 is small), the positive
e¤ect of allowing it to imitate foreign IPR is stronger.
As a result, if a court has welfare-maximizing objectives, it would tend to favor domestic
rms in their litigations against foreign when both domestic and foreign rm tend to be larger.
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B.1 Derivation of equilibrium trade policies
Consumerspreferences are given by
U (X0; Xi) = X0 +
NX
i=1
ai lnXi;
NX
i=1
ai = 1
Xi =
0@ X
j=H;P;F
kijX
f=1
d
1
i
ijfc
i 1
i
ijf
1A
i
i 1
Utility-maximizing consumption of variety (i; j; f) is
cij =
aidijf
pijf

pijf
Pi
1 i
where pijf is the price for variety (i; j; f) and Pi is the ideal price index for product i:
Pi =
0@ X
j=H;P;F
kijX
f=1
dijfc
1 i
ijf
1A 11 i
We assume that rms from the same country and industry are symmetric and share the same
constant marginal costs cij so that the rm subscript can be skipped for brevity. With the
specic tari¤ on imports of good i from country j given by  ij (  iH = 0), prot function of a
103
rm from country j operating in industry i is
ij = (pij   cij    ij) qij
and the prot-maximizing price is
pij =
i
i   1 (cij +  ij)
Before deriving equilibrium trade policies, it is useful to calculate the responsiveness of equilib-
rium prices and quantities to change in the tari¤ rate.
@qij
@ iF
= (i   1) qij
Pi
@Pi
@ iF
; j = H;P
@qiF
@ iF
= (i   1) qiF
Pi
@Pi
@ iF
  
2
i
i   1
qiF
piF
@Pi
@ iF
=
i
i   1siF
Pi
piF
where sji =
nijpijqij
XiPi
= nijdij

pij
Pi
1 i
is the share of rms from country j in the home countrys
market for good i.
The e¤ect of a change in tari¤  iF in tari¤ revenue (TR), consumer surplus (CS), and
prots are
@TR
@ iF
=
@ ( iPniP piP qiP +  iFniF piF qiF )
@ iF
= Xi
@Pi
@ iF

(i   1)  iP
piP
sPi +
i   1
i
+
 iF
piF

(i   1) sFi   i

@CS
@ iF
=  Xi @Pi
@ iF
@ (nijij)
@ iF
=
i   1
i
sjiXi
@Pi
@ iF
; for j = H;P
@ (niFiF )
@ iF
=  i   1
i

1  sFi

Xi
@Pi
@ iF
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B.2 Non-cooperative trade policy
Without political economy factors and cooperating in trade policies between FTA member
countries, home country government chooses import tari¤s in order to maximize the following
objective function:
G0 () =W0 () = CS + TR+
X
i
niHiH
The rst-order condition is
@G0
@ iF
= Xi
@Pi
@ iF

(i   1)  iP
piP
sPi  
1
i
+
 iF
piF

(i   1) sFi   i

+
i   1
i
sHi

= 0
Solving it for  iFpiF , we obtain the equilibrium non-cooperative ad-valorem tari¤ rate for imports
from country F; ti:
"it
F
i = (i   1) tPi sPi  
1
i
+
i   1
i
sHi (B.1)
where "i =
@qiF
@piF
piF
qiF
is the price elasticity of demand for imports from country F . Allowing
import tari¤s and market shares to vary over time, the change in the MFN tari¤ is then equal
to
"it
F
it = (i   1)
 
tPits
P
it

+
i   1
i
sHit
B.3 Cooperative trade policy
When home and partner countries set trade policies cooperatively, the objective function of the
home country government is
G1 () =W0 () + b
X
i
niPiP = CS + TR+
X
i
(niHiH + bniPiP )
where b 2 [0; 1] is the parameter that reects relative importance of domestic and partners
welfare for home countrys government and measures the degree of political cooperation. The
rst order condition for import tari¤ in the presence of an FTA is
@G1
@ iF
=
@G0
@ iF
+ b
i   1
i
sPi Xi
@Pi
@ iF
= 0
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and the resulting equilibrium cooperative tari¤ for imports from outsider of the agreement is
"it
F
i = (i   1)
 
tPi s
P
i
  1
i
+
i   1
i
sHi + b
i   1
i
sPi (B.2)
The short-run year-to-year changes in the MFN tari¤ following FTA formation are then equal
to
"it
F
it = (i   1)
 
tPits
P
it

+
i   1
i
sHit + b
i   1
i
sPit
In order to identify long-run change in the MFN tari¤ resulting from FTA formation, we need to
compare the MFN rates at the end of the ten-year CUSFTA grace period to the pre-FTA rates.
Assuming that FTA has no impact on the degree of cooperation between member countries (i.e.
parameter b does not change over time), the equilibrium pre-FTA tari¤ rate is
"it
F
i = (i   1)
 
tPi s
P
i
  1
i
+
i   1
i
sHi + b
i   1
i

sPi
sPi + s
F
i

(B.3)
Without an FTA, cooperation between H and P will have an additional negative impact on
the MFN tari¤ captured by the last term on the right-hand side which is proportional to the
share of imports from partner country in total imports of country H. Subtracting (B.3) from
(B.2) we obtain the change in the MFN tari¤
"i9t
F
it = (i   1)9
 
tPits
P
it

+
i   1
i
9s
H
it + b
i   1
i

s1Pi +
s0Pi
s0Pi + s
0F
i

(B.4)
where 9xit = x1i  x0i and x1i stands for the value of variable x in the nal year of the CUSFTA
and x0i for the pre-CUSFTA value.
It is also possible that negotiations and implementation of the agreement can boost coop-
eration between member countries on various issues, including trade policy. In the extreme
case when there is no cooperation between home and partner country before the agreement,
pre-FTA tari¤ rate would be given by (B.1) and the change in the MFN tari¤ is thus
"i9t
F
it = (i   1)9
 
tPits
P
it

+
i   1
i
9s
H
it + b
i   1
i
sPi (B.5)
In the absence of any restrictions on tFit adjustments the e¤ect of tari¤ cooperation could be
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estimated directly from (B.4) or (B.5).
B.4 Cooperative trade policy under political economy
In the presence of political economy factors, the home country government set import tari¤ to
maximize the weighted sum of national welfare, partner countrys rent, and political contribu-
tions from domestic industries C:
G2 () = aW0 () + b
X
i
niPiP + C ()
where a represents governments preference for welfare relative to contributions. We follow
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) and model this lobbying process as a simple bargaining
process between government and industries so that the equilibrium political tari¤ maximizes
the sum of payo¤s:
F = argmax
(
aW0 +  (CS + TR) +
X
i
[bniPiP + IiiH ]
)
where Ii is a binary variable which takes the value of one for politically organized industries
and  is the share of population represented by lobbying groups. Solving for the equilibrium
tari¤ we obtain (see Stoyanov, 2014, for complete derivation):
"it
F
i = (i   1) tPi sPi  
1
i
+
i   1
i

a
a+ 
sHi +
1
a+ 
Iis
H
i

+
ab
a+ 
i   1
i

sPi
sPi + s
F
i

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The response of price and quantity to change in the tari¤ rate:
@xiH
@ if
= (i   1) xiH
Pi
@Pi
@ if
@xirj
@ if
= (i   1)
xirj
Pi
@Pi
@ if
@xifj
@ if
=  i
xifj
1   if + (i   1)
xifj
Pi
@Pi
@ if
@Pi
@ if
=
Pi
1   if
FX
fj=1
nifjdifj

pifj
Pi
1 i
=
Pi
1   if
FX
fj=1
sifj
Response of consumer surplus to changes in external tari¤:
Consumer surplus is
CS() = V (Y; Pi)  Y =  
nX
i=1
ai +
nX
i=1
ai ln

ai
Pi

=
nX
i=1
ai (ln ai   1  lnPi)
@CS()
@ if
=   ai
Pi
@Pi
@ if
=  Xi @Pi
@ if
=  Xi Pi
1   if
FX
fj=1
sifj
Response of tari¤ revenue to change in external tari¤:
@TR()
@ if
=
@
Pn
i=1
PF;R
j=1  ijpijnijxij
@ if
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=FX
fj=1

aisifj +
ai(1  i)
1   if  ifsifj + (i   1)Xi
@Pi
@ if
 ifsifj

+
RX
rj=1
(i   1) @Pi
@ if
Xi irjsirj
=
FX
fj=1
aisifj  
FX
fj=1
ai(i   1)
1   if  ifsifj +
FX
fj=1
(i   1)Xi @Pi
@ if
 ifsifj +
RX
rj=1
(i   1) @Pi
@ if
Xi irjsirj
= ai
FX
fj=1
sifj  
ai(i   1)
1   if  if
FX
fj=1
sifj +(i  1)Xi
@Pi
@ if
 if
FX
fj=1
sifj +(i  1)
@Pi
@ if
Xi
RX
rj=1
 irjsirj
=
ai(1   if )
Pi
@Pi
@ if
 ai(i   1)
1   if  if
(1   if )
Pi
@Pi
@ if
+(i 1)Xi @Pi
@ if
 if
FX
fj=1
sifj+(i 1)
@Pi
@ if
Xi
RX
rj=1
 irjsirj
= Xi
@Pi
@ if
241   if   (i   1) if + (i   1) if FX
fj=1
sifj + (i   1)
RX
rj=1
 irjsirj
35
Response of rmsprots to change in external tari¤:
@
Pn
i=1
PR
rj=1
nirjirj
@ if
=
i   1
i
Xi
@Pi
@ if
RX
rj=1
(1   irj )sirj
@
Pn
i=1
PF
fi=1
nifiifi
@ if
= Xi
@Pi
@ if
24 1   if
i
+
i   1
i
(1   if )
FX
fj=1
sifj  
i   1
i
(1   if )
35
= Xi
@Pi
@ if
24 1   if
i
  i   1
i
(1   if )
0@1  FX
fj=1
sifj
1A35 (C.1)
Import demand elasticity:
@xifj
@ if
 if
xifj
=
 if
1   if
24 i + (i   1) FX
fj=1
sifj
35
jiF j =
1   if
 if
@xifj
@ if
 if
xifj
= i   (i   1)
FX
fj=1
sifj
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@xifj
@pifj
pifj
xifj
=
@xifj
@ if
@ if
@pifj
pifj
xifj
=
24 ixifj
1   if + (i   1)
xifj
Pi
Pi
1   if
FX
fj=1
sifj
35 (i   1)(1   if )
icifj
pifj
xifj
=  i + (i   1)
FX
fj=1
sifj
jiF j =
@xifj@pifj pifjxifj
 = i   (i   1) FX
fj=1
sifj
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